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ABSTRACT
Last year, as the State of California struggled with a $42 billion
budget deficit, its financial inability to correct constitutionally
deficient prison conditions led a federal court to order the release of
40,000 state prisoners. In Oregon, Michigan, Connecticut, Vermont,
and Delaware, spending on corrections now exceeds spending on
higher education. Across the nation, more than one of every one
hundred Americans is behind bars. When the financial crisis of 2008
dealt its blow, state correctional budgets were already nearing a
breaking point. Now, in the wake of unprecedented budget shortfalls,
state governments have been forced to confront a difficult reality: the
ever-increasing prison population has come at too high a price. The
question is no longer whether to reduce the number of prisoners, but
how. 
Reversing years of ever-harsher sentencing policies, jurisdictions
throughout the United States are trying to cut costs by expanding
good time credit, increasing parole eligibility, and authorizing new
forms of early release. This Article examines judicial sentence
modification, an often overlooked ameliorative mechanism that has
potential benefits many other forms of early release lack. For states
wishing to promote early release in a manner that is both trans-
parent and publicly accountable, judicial sentence modification is a
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promising, and potentially sustainable, new mechanism for sentence
reduction. 
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INTRODUCTION
From the early 1980s through the beginning of the twenty-first
century, U.S. state and federal crime policy was characterized by
increasingly harsh custodial penalties. “Tough on crime” was the
rhetoric of the day: the number of criminal sanctions increased and
the length of custodial sentences soared.1 Public demand for “truth
in sentencing” and accountability for offenders and criminal justice
administrators led to the abolition of parole in many jurisdictions
and limited early release in still more.2 Mandatory minimum
sentences, penalty enhancements, and determinate sentencing
schemes became key tools in the law enforcement arsenal, all
designed to get—and keep—criminals off the streets.3 Yet despite
significant drops in the rate of violent crime throughout the 1990s,
the growth in imprisonment continued unabated.4
As a result of the move toward more punitive policies, the number
of persons confined in U.S. jails and prisons increased substantially
—from just over 1.1 million in 1990 to 2.3 million in 2008.5 The
United States now imprisons its residents at a rate seven times
higher than Western European nations.6 Though scholars have
1. See generally MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2d ed. 2006).
2. See, e.g., PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf (describing abolition of parole in fourteen states).
3. MAUER, supra note 1, at 45-48.
4. The U.S. Crime Index Rate rose gradually from 1960 to 1980, dropped significantly
from 1980 to 1984, and then rose again until 1991, when it went into steady decline. LEONARD
A. MAROWITZ, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CTR., WHY DID THE CRIME RATE DECREASE
THROUGH 1999? (AND WHY MIGHT IT DECREASE OR INCREASE IN 2000 AND BEYOND?) 3 (2000),
available at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/misc/why/rpt.pdf. FBI crime statistics show that
after a brief uptick in crime from 2005 to 2006, crime rates are once again declining and have
reached near record lows. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
(2009), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/index.html.
5. Compare ALLEN J. BECK & DARRELL K. GILLIARD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 1994, at 2 (1995), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/Pi94.pdf,
with WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2008, at 8 (2009),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf. 
6. Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, and the Future of
Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 857 (2009); see also Alfred Blumstein, Michael
Tonry & Asheley Van Ness, Cross-National Measures of Punitiveness, 33 CRIME & JUST. 347,
358-60, 375 (2005) (describing differences between U.S. and European rates of imprisonment
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posited many possible explanations for this disparity, no single
theory appears to capture the causes of “American exceptionalism,”
and the reasons for its persistence remain a source of much debate.7 
What is not debated is the fact that America’s growing prison
population has come at a cost. The human costs of incarceration
have led to widespread critiques of America’s overreliance on
incarceration as a tool of social control.8 In recent years, however, it
is the financial consequences of current penal policy that have
drawn the most attention from policymakers. As the number of
inmates has burgeoned, correctional budgets have been strained by
many factors. Larger prison populations have led to the construction
of more prisons with associated staffing and overhead expenses.9
More prisoners has also meant higher costs for basic necessities,
along with increased costs for “optional” programming, such as
GED instruction, vocational training, and drug and alcohol reha-
bilitation.10 Significant, too, has been the rapidly rising cost of
delivering even rudimentary health care—a cost states bear in full
for those within their custody.11 
with respect to various crimes).
7. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE
WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR
(2007); Michael Tonry, Explanations of American Punishment Policies: A National History,
11 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 377, 377-79 (2009) [hereinafter Tonry, Explanations].
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. SARAH LAWRENCE & JEREMY TRAVIS, URBAN INST., THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF
IMPRISONMENT: MAPPING AMERICA'S PRISON EXPANSION 8 (2004), http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/410994_mapping_prisons.pdf (“During the last quarter of the twentieth
century, state prison systems grew from 592 prisons to 1,023 prisons—an increase of 73
percent.”).
10. In some jurisdictions, programs once thought to be central to achieving institutional
objectives, such as internal order maintenance and preparation for successful release, were
reduced or even eliminated altogether as a result of fiscal and capacity constraints. See, e.g.,
RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS POLICY IN AN ERA OF FISCAL RESTRAINT 11-15 (2002), available at http://www.
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_statesentencingpolicy.pdf (describing correctional
cost reduction measures such as cuts in education and drug treatment programming).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(28)(A) (2006) (prohibiting states from receiving federal reim-
bursement for the medical costs of inmates of public institutions); Eric Neisser, Is There a
Doctor in the Joint? The Search for Constitutional Standards for Prison Health Care, 63 VA.
L. REV. 921, 936 n.76 (1977) (discussing fiscal ramifications of the inmate exception on the
provision of prison health care); infra note 130.
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State correctional costs are now estimated to exceed $50 billion
annually.12 That sum would be burdensome in the most affluent of
times, but in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, it has become
unsustainable. Spurred to action by funding deficits, many states
began to pass legislation and implement administrative measures
designed to reduce incarceration rates, increase public safety,
improve successful re-integration for former offenders, and, ideally,
alleviate the financial burdens of the “tough on crime” policies that
defined the period from 1980 to 2000.13 Some of these measures
have focused on reducing the number of people entering prison as
a result of conviction or revocation from community supervision.
Many others, however, have focused on reducing the number of
people in custody following conviction by authorizing early release.14 
Although some of these back-end legislative reforms have already
delivered a modicum of short-term relief in the form of reduced
sentences and their associated cost-savings,15 there are reasons to
question long-term sustainability of many new early release laws.16
With rare exception, new legislation places the release decision in
the hands of prison administrators or parole boards that are
unaccountable to the communities in which offenders have been
sentenced and to which they will often return. By failing to grapple
with concerns about transparency and public accountability, these
new legislative reforms leave themselves vulnerable to the criti-
cisms that led to the dissolution of prior forms of early release.17
This Article examines the recent proliferation of early release
legislation and highlights judicial sentence modification—until now
a largely overlooked ameliorative mechanism—as an additional, and
potentially more sustainable, tool for states wishing to promote
early release in a manner that is both transparent and publicly
accountable. Part I reviews in some detail the policy concerns and
legislative changes that led to the abolition or restriction of early
12. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 11
(2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PSPP_1in31_
report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf [hereinafter ONE IN 31].
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part II.B.
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release in most jurisdictions from 1980 to 2000. Part II examines a
variety of common legislative responses to the mounting correc-
tional crisis, analyzing the ways in which they work and exploring
questions about their long-term sustainability. Part III then intro-
duces judicial sentence modification as an additional and currently
underutilized mechanism for early release. After examining the
mechanism’s unique history and characteristics, the Article con-
cludes that judicial sentence modification merits greater attention,
not only because of its ability to reduce sentence lengths, but also
because of its potential for enhancing the public legitimacy of the
early release decision.
I. HOW WE GOT HERE
A. Shifting Sensibilities
At the turn of the twentieth century, reformers schooled in the
emerging field of criminology began to champion a new model of
incarceration. They asserted that the prison ought to be more than
a place of detention: it should be a state-of-the-art facility designed
to reform the criminally deficient through “correctional” program-
ming.18 In order to promote and facilitate rehabilitation, reformers
urged states to transition away from the short, determinate sen-
tences favored in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to a
model of indeterminate sentencing in which release was tied
directly to successful rehabilitation.19 Unlike the old determinate
18. Criminologists such as William White argued that “degeneracy” was a disease and
that criminals “should be sent to reformatories as patients, to remain until cured and not for
a fixed time, and criminals should know that this is the course and that liberty depends on
themselves.” Criminality a Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1895, at 1; see also The Medical
Aspects of Crime, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 100, 100 (1899) (reporting on the 1899 meeting of the
American Medical Association at which one of the keynote speakers advocated “that
inebriates should be kept in prolonged confinement under treatment[;] ... that all sentences
should be indeterminate pending reformation or cure; and lastly, that there should be
penitentiaries for the lifelong incarceration of those who are incapable of reformation”). 
19. As one scholar of the period explained: 
A madman or a person afflicted with a dangerous disease is prevented, for his
own interests as well as the interests of the community, from freely moving
about until he is restored to health; so the criminal, for his own interests as well
as the interests of society, is prevented from moving freely about until he is
cured from his criminal proclivity; and as in the first case so in the second, it is
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sentencing system, which required judges to set firm release dates
for defendants, the indeterminate sentencing model required judges
to impose a range of permissible punishment. Parole boards then
decided when to authorize any given offender’s release based on the
board’s subjective assessment of the offender’s personal rehabilita-
tion.20 
Advocates of the indeterminate sentence saw it as a humanitar-
ian reform that would bring much needed treatment to those whose
criminal deficiencies led them to pose risks to society at large.21
They hailed the dawn of a new era of reform that would end the
perceived brutality of retributive sentencing and would convert
prisons into places of healing and reconciliation.22 So successful
were these arguments that by mid-century, all states and the
federal government had adopted some form of indeterminate sen-
tencing.23 
impossible to fix beforehand the date when the restoration to a normal condition
will be effected. Therefore ... the sentence must not be for a certain period, but
for a certain purpose, i.e., until reformation is effected. 
Alexander Winter, The Modern Spirit in Penology, 8 POL. SCI. Q. 445, 454 (1893). 
20. For example, New York’s criminal code instructed:
When it appears to the board of parole that there is a strong reasonable
probability that any inmate will remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, they shall issue
to such inmate an absolute release or discharge from imprisonment. 
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 93 (1920). Several other states’ parole statutes used nearly identical
language. REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE PAROLE COMMISSION TO THE LEGISLATURE 123
(1927). 
21. See Edward D. Duffield, Criminal Law Reform (Report of the Committee of the
American Prison Association), 9 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 195 (1918)
(asserting that “[b]y common consent those interested in prison reform have reached the
conclusion that [indeterminate sentencing] furnishes the best method of fixing the extent of
punishment it is necessary for society to inflict in order to produce the result sought” and
arguing that “[i]t should be the purpose of this Association to see that it is universally
adopted”); Eugene Smith, The Old Penology and the New, 184 N. AM. REV. 80, 83-86 (1907)
(describing a shift from the old penology, focused on retribution and sentences fixed in
advance, toward the new penology, characterized by indeterminate sentences and efforts to
reform prisoners).
22. See, e.g., Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L.J. 17, 20 (1899)
(“The principle of the reformatory sentence, in its completeness, implies the conversion of the
prison into an institution combining the means and aims of hospital, school and church, for
the healing and culture of body, mind and will.... [I]t is to be held in view as the standard by
which our partial and tentative reforms must be measured; and just in the degree that it is
approached will the possible beneficence of the principle be realized.”).
23. “By 1925, forty-six out of the forty-eight states of the union had parole laws,” and the
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Throughout the first six decades of the twentieth century,
rehabilitation was considered the chief purpose of sentencing and
the indeterminate sentence served increasingly as its primary tool.24
During the 1970s, however, new research gave rise to doubts about
the effectiveness and fairness of the rehabilitative model. In a
number of influential studies and articles, prominent academics
questioned whether then-existing correctional programs were
capable of achieving their stated goals.25 In 1974, Robert Martinson
famously wrote that “[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the
rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no
appreciable effect on recidivism.”26 Although Martinson himself left
open the possibility that the failure of programs might be more
attributable to poor execution than to the impossibility of success,
he did question whether it was true that “we haven’t the faintest
clue about how to rehabilitate offenders and reduce recidivism.”27 In
the wake of his seminal work, many commentators began to assert
that the rehabilitative ideal was unachievable: “Nothing works”
became the motto of the day.28 
laggards (Mississippi and Virginia) “fell into line by 1942.” LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 304 (1993); see also MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING
MATTERS 6 (1996) [hereinafter TONRY, MATTERS] (noting that in 1970, every state in the
United States had an indeterminate sentencing system).
24. See AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 36-38 (1971) (“The individualized treatment model ... has for nearly
a century been the ideological spring from which almost all actual and proposed reform in
criminal justice has been derived. It would be hard to exaggerate the power of this idea or the
extent of its influence.... [T]he movement toward the individualized treatment model is
unmistakable. Every state has some form of parole, which provides a core indeterminancy.”).
25. Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INT. 22, 22-23 (1974); see also DOUGLAS LIPTON, ROBERT MARTINSON & JUDITH WILKS,
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION
STUDIES 6-8 (1975) (conducting a seminal review of 231 studies of rehabilitative prison
programming and concluding that there was no correlation between programming and actual
rehabilitation); David F. Greenberg, The Correctional Effects of Corrections, in CORRECTIONS
AND PUNISHMENT 111, 140-41 (David F. Greenberg ed., 1977) (reviewing various studies and
concluding that many rehabilitative programs fail to reduce recidivism). 
26. Martinson, supra note 25, at 25 (emphasis omitted).
27. Id. at 48 (emphasis omitted).
28. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 18 (1976)
(asserting that while “[i]t would be an exaggeration to say that no treatment methods work
.... in the more commonplace instances where no successful treatments are known, the
rehabilitative disposition is plainly untenable”); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME
43-63 (1975) (arguing that rehabilitative policies have derived from criminologists’ opinions
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Further undermining the theoretical soundness of the rehabil-
itative ideal were scholars who questioned whether it was the right
of the state to interfere with an offender’s motivations and thoughts
—indeed, with his very soul—through coercive programming.29 To
some, the problem with state-sanctioned rehabilitation was that it
impermissibly imposed on the moral autonomy of the criminal
offender.30 For others, the rehabilitative ideal reduced to a form of
covert class warfare that threatened undeserved punishment on
those whose lifestyles and mores differed from those favored by the
governing elite.31 Regardless of the form the critique assumed, there
was a growing skepticism among observers that penal rehabil-
itationism was either as effective or humane as previously assumed. 
Practical and philosophical doubts regarding the validity of the
practice of indeterminate sentencing were bolstered by other
systemic concerns. Unlike sentencing decisions made in open court,
release decisions in the indeterminate system were made privately,
always outside public view, often without input from victims or
other interested parties, and ordinarily without explanation.32
Statewide parole boards were typically composed of political
appointees who often lacked knowledge about the local conditions
to which offenders would return upon release.33 Moreover, board
rather than any evidence that the policies work).
29. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 18 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975). 
30. See, e.g., VON HIRSCH, supra note 28, at 17. 
31. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 39 (1981) (describing
“what has come to be known as the social control school” of criminology, in which “an effort
is made to incorporate social deviance and the repressive responses of the bourgeois society
into a much broader theory of social dynamics”); AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 24, at
85 (“An important force in the reform movement was the mixture of hatred, fear, and
revulsion that white, middle-class, Protestant reformers felt toward lower-class persons....
These difficult feelings were disguised as humanitarian concern for the ‘health’ of threatening
subculture members. Imprisonment dressed up as treatment was a particularly suitable
response for reformers’ complicated and inconsistent feelings.”).
32. See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1972)
(“Whatever the qualities of prison life itself ... parole officials carry on for the most part the
motif of Kafka’s nightmares. It has been expressed by the United States Board of Parole
almost as a matter of pride that the judgment whether or when a prisoner will be released is
inscrutable.” (footnote omitted)); Robert W. Kastenmeier & Howard C. Eglit, Parole Release
Decision-Making: Rehabilitation, Expertise, and the Demise of Mythology, 22 AM. U. L. REV.
477, 481 (1973).
33. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing To
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members acted with nearly unfettered discretion: their decisions
were usually unreviewable and were often made in reliance on
institutional factors that bore only a tenuous connection to public
safety.34 Judge Marvin Frankel criticized the system thusly:
As things stand in most jurisdictions ... and have long stood,
parole boards, subject to no precise criteria and offering no
explicit clues as to why particular decisions go as they do,
exercise secretly the power to decide within broad ranges the
actual number of years of confinement.... Decisions based upon
secret reasons bear no credentials of care or legitimacy.35
The insular and unexplained nature of these release decisions led
many critics, inside and outside the academy, to assert that the
practice of parole undermined accountability, thwarted judicial
sentencing decisions, and lacked legitimacy.36 Similar criticisms
Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 504 & n.59 (2008) (collecting
authorities).
34. Robert M. Garber & Christina Maslach, The Parole Hearing: Decision or Justification?,
1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 261-63, 278-80 (1977) (suggesting that parole hearings may not
have any effect on the parole release decision based on a study of parole hearings in
California); Edward A. Gargan, Has Parole Run out of Time in New York?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1984, at E8 (quoting Lawrence T. Kurlander, criminal justice coordinator for Governor
Mario Cuomo, stating, “Right now we have judges supposedly doing the sentencing.... But the
real sentencing is being done by the Parole Board within the confines of prison walls, by what
criteria we don’t know.”).
35. Frankel, supra note 32, at 15-16. One commentator described the attacks on parole
in this way: 
At the heart of the attack on the discretionary power of parole boards was not
only the essential arbitrariness of many of their decisions but also a general lack
of concern to articulate the principles and criteria underlying them. At times,
parole authorities appeared to take pride in the indecipherability of their work.
Even when parole authorities did have explicit criteria and principles, this did
not necessarily resolve the problem, as they never really have clarified the
process by which decisions to grant or deny parole were made. 
A. Keith Bottomley, Parole in Transition: A Comparative Study of Origins, Developments, and
Prospects for the 1990s, 12 CRIME & JUST. 319, 338 (1990) (citations omitted).
36. See Kastenmeier & Eglit, supra note 32, at 494 (asserting that now-discredited
rehabilitative considerations drove the “diminution of the role of the judiciary in determining
the length of incarceration to be served by a convicted offender”); Wendell Rawls Jr.,
Pennsylvania Shapes Prison Law To Cut Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1982, at A1 (discussing
new laws abolishing parole and quoting a member of Pennsylvania Governor Dick
Thornburgh’s administration as stating, “The public is ... often misled by the news media into
thinking that a person sentenced to two to 10 years is going to serve as much as 10 years ....
What we are looking for is greater accountability in sentencing and release and more
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were leveled against the use of sentence credits, which allowed
prison officials to shorten sentences administratively to control
overcrowding and reward compliance with institutional rules.37 As
a result of these concerns over the unguided and opaque manner in
which ameliorative mechanisms were being used, many scholars
and politicians began to advocate for the adoption of more certain
durations of confinement, with a severely circumscribed role for all
mechanisms governing early release.38 
As reformers began calling for a shift away from indeterminate
sentencing based on doubts about its efficacy and fairness, other
phenomena pushed public sentiment away from the humanistic
principles that had animated the rehabilitative ideal.39 With a few
short-lived exceptions, the U.S. Crime Index rose steadily from 1960
to 1991,40 and fear of crime rose with it. Polls conducted in the mid-
1970s and early 1980s found that roughly half of all American
adults felt uncomfortable walking alone, and that two of every five
Americans were “highly fearful” of falling victim to violent crime.41
The rising crime rates attracted considerable attention,42 and
responsible sentencing by judges.”).
37. See, e.g., James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 217, 221 (1982) (arguing for the abolition of good time credit in favor of “more open
practices beyond the control of prison authorities” that are “less prone to abuse”).
38. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING 138-39 (3d ed. 1994)
[hereinafter ABA: SENTENCING] (proposing determinate sentence with limited good time as
the only method of sentence reduction); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL
SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 3-4 (1976); VON HIRSCH, supra note 28, at 98-
102; see also George F. Cole, A Return to Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1978, at CN20
(“During the last five years ... [r]ehabilitation as the goal [of imprisonment] has given way to
calls for a simpler, fairer and more open form of justice. Not only has there been an
accumulating literature pointing to the ineffectiveness of rehabilitative programs, the
disparity of sentences and the often whimsical nature of the parole decision, but also the
pervasiveness of the discretion required by the treatment model has been of mounting concern
to scholars, prisoners, practitioners and politicians.”).
39. For a more detailed and nuanced description of the reasons underlying shifts in public
sentiment during this period, see Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal
Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1238-39 (2005).
40. MAROWITZ, supra note 4, at 3. 
41. MARK H. MOORE & ROBERT C. TROJANOWICZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICING AND THE
FEAR OF CRIME 2 (1988), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/111459.pdf. 
42. Barbara Basler, Serious Crimes Nearing Record in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
1980, at B1 (describing a sharp rise in crime in New York City as part of national trend);
Linda Greenhouse, Burger Urges Plan of ‘Damage Control’ To End Cities’ Crime, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1981, at A1 (reporting on the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court’s call for a new
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contributed to public and academic calls for reform in policing,
prosecution, sentencing, and imprisonment.43
B. Legislative Responses
Although states responded in various ways to changing public
attitudes toward crime and sentencing following the collapse of the
rehabilitative ideal, the general legislative trend was toward
sentences that were both longer and more rigid.44 Newly passed
legislation increased maximum penalties, added new penalty
enhancers, adopted determinate sentencing schemes, and abolished
traditional forms of early release.
In the states, legislatures raised maximum sentences for
standard offenses,45 created mandatory minimum sentences,46
ambitious program to address rising crime rates, and his description of urban crime as
“terrorism” and “warfare”).
43. The rising crime rate alone does not explain the massive shift toward more punitive
sanctions, however. Other developed nations saw similar increases in crime throughout the
same period, and none revised their sentencing policies as swiftly or as harshly as did the
United States. Tonry, Explanations, supra note 7, at 379. Moreover, many of the most
punitive reforms to come would be enacted after 1990, when crime rates began to fall
precipitously. See id.
What explains the change in public sentiment that began in the 1970s? Scholars have
suggested causes ranging from “conditions of late modernity,” GARLAND, supra note 7, at 193
(including globalization and increased public fear about crime and society more generally),
to the American political structure and style, to racial tensions, and to “a Manichean
moralism associated with Protestant fundamentalism.” Tonry, Explanations, supra note 7,
at 379. Whatever combination of complex causes best explains the phenomenon, this much
is clear: by the early 1980s, legislators, prosecutors, judges, and ordinary citizens alike began
pressing for greater and more certain punishment for criminal offenders.
44. For further discussion of this phenomenon, see MICHAEL TONRY, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, THE FRAGMENTATION OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 2 (1999),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/175721.pdf. 
45. In Wisconsin, for example, the maximum term of imprisonment for a Class B felony
increased from twenty years imprisonment to forty years in 1994 and then to sixty years in
1999. Compare WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3)(b) (1990), with WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3)(b) (1994), and
WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3)(b) (2000). 
46. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (1991), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ r_congress/MANMIN.pdf (“Today there are approximately 100 separate
federal mandatory minimum penalty provisions located in 60 different criminal statutes.”);
TONRY, MATTERS, 23, at 146 (“By 1983, forty-nine of the fifty states ... had adopted mandatory
sentencing laws for offenses other than murder or drunk driving.”).
478 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:465
and enacted three-strikes provisions.47 Hate crime statutes48 and
repeat offender enhancements49 also contributed to sentences of
increasing duration. Lawmakers do not bear sole responsibility for
the incarceral trends of the period, however. When exercising
charging discretion, prosecutors began seeking convictions under
newly enacted criminal legislation and demanding penalties in
accordance with the enhanced sentencing provisions. Judges
followed suit and began sentencing offenders to sentences of longer
and more certain durations of confinement. And even in those
47. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2006) (providing for a mandatory life sentence for those
convicted of serious violent felonies on three separate occasions, first passed in 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1982 (1994)); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2010) (codifying
California’s three-strikes law, passed in 1994 both through the legislative process and by
Proposition 184, establishing lengthy sentences, often twenty-five years to life, for those
convicted of three separate felonies); N.M. STAT. § 31-18-23 (1996) (statute first taking effect
in 1994, establishing mandatory life sentence with possibility of parole after thirty years, for
those convicted of three violent felonies); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9714 (2001) (statute first taking
effect in 1995, establishing sentences of twenty-five years to life for those convicted of three
crimes of violence); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-120 (1995) (statute first taking effect in 1994,
providing for a sentence of life without parole for those convicted of three felonies); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.94A.555 (2010) (statute first taking effect in 1993, establishing sentences for
defendants convicted of three most serious offenses).
48. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-222 (2009) (statute first passed in 1989, providing
that offenders committing any crimes because of the victim’s “race, creed, religion, color,
national origin, or involvement in civil rights or human rights activities” may receive a
sentence from two to ten years in addition to and consecutive to the penalty for the offense
itself); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.47 (Vernon 2010) (statute first passed in 1993, increasing
the penalty to the next higher offense category when motivated by bias or prejudice regarding
“race, color, disability, religion, national origin or ancestry, age, gender, or sexual preference”
(quoting by reference TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.014 (Vernon 2010))); WIS. STAT. §
939.645 (2009) (statute, first passed in 1987, allowing for increases in fines and prison
sentences for offenders targeting victims based on their “race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry”). At the federal level, the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 specified that sentences be enhanced at least “3 offense levels
for offenses that ... are hate crimes.” Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2096 (1994) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note).
49. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101(2) (1996) (stating that any person with three
separate prior felony convictions who is convicted of another felony will be adjudged an
habitual offender and must receive a sentence four times the maximum range of the felony
classification of the offense); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7(a) (1994) (mandating that anyone with
a prior felony conviction who commits another felony punishable by a prison sentence must
be sentenced to the maximum for the offense); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A)(1)(a) (1996)
(establishing that anyone convicted of a second felony may be sentenced for a term of as much
as twice the longest term available for the first conviction); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.090
(1996) (providing that every person convicted of a felony who has one prior felony conviction
must receive a sentence of at least ten years).
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jurisdictions where parole remained legally available, executive
branch officers—often at the direction of politically accountable
state officials—became more reluctant to exercise their release
authority.50 
In the federal system, the desire for harsher and more certain
punishment was expressed through several major legislative acts.
First and most notable was the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984 (CCCA), which abandoned indeterminate sentencing in the
federal system and adopted mandatory penalty guidelines for use
in all federal criminal sentencings.51 Ten years after the CCCA was
passed, Congress acted again to toughen criminal penalties and
encourage the widespread adoption of determinate sentencing
legislation. Described by President Bill Clinton as “the toughest,
largest, and smartest Federal attack on crime in the history of the
United States of America,”52 the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCCLEA) resurrected the federal death
penalty and introduced three-strikes legislation.53 The Act and its
1996 amendments also provided prison-building grants to all states
that required violent prisoners to serve longer portions of their
sentences.54 
50. See Kevin R. Reitz, Questioning the Conventional Wisdom of Parole Release Authority,
in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 199, 227 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) (noting that “most parole
boards in the 1980s and 1990s became stingier in their release decisions”). 
51. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, 1991-92 (1984). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
remained mandatory until 2005, when the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory
application of the Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005). Since Booker, federal judges have continued to anchor
their sentencing decisions in the Sentencing Guidelines, but retain discretion to vary from
them. Federal sentences continue to be determinate. 
52. Remarks on Anticrime Legislation at the Department of Justice, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1324
(July 28, 1994). 
53. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959-60, 1982 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994
note).
54. WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., URBAN INST., INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING
REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS 1-3
(2002), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195161.pdf (citing Department
of Justice Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)). The Violent
Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Formula Grant Program
authorized by the original and amended legislation provided federal funds to help states
increase their prison capacity by funding the building and expansion of correctional facilities
and jails. 42 U.S.C. § 13702 (1996). The funds have not, however, covered the ongoing cost of
maintaining new facilities. Although more than $2.7 billion in grant funds were awarded to
states between 1996 and 2001, Congress has since ceased to appropriate additional funds. See
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Although twenty states and the District of Columbia modified
their sentencing laws following passage of the VCCLEA, in reality
the legislative incentive played a minor role in the move to determi-
nate sentencing. By the time the VCCLEA amendments took effect,
a majority of states had already begun to adjust their sentencing
practices in accordance with new sensibilities. In 1984, the State of
Washington became the first to enact so-called “truth-in-sentencing”
legislation,55 and Utah, Oregon, Delaware, and others soon followed
suit.56 Following passage of the VCCLEA, twenty additional states
and the District of Columbia modified their sentencing practices to
a degree that qualified them for funding under the VCCLEA;
however, survey findings suggested that federal incentive grants
were the primary motivating factor in the enactment of tougher
sentencing laws in only four states.57 In the remaining sixteen
states, the move to determinate sentencing was a response to
mounting public pressure from within each state to provide for more
certain punishment.58 By the end of the 1990s, determinate sen-
tencing was at its height with 84 percent of states placing firm
limits on the amount of time prisoners were required to serve before
becoming eligible for release.59 The vast majority of these states re-
quired prisoners to serve more than 85 percent of their sentences.60 
At the same time jurisdictions were adopting determinate
sentencing, many also moved to restrict or eliminate traditional
mechanisms for early release. The CCCA abolished parole for
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, VIOLENT OFFENDER INCARCERATION AND TRUTH-IN-
SENTENCING INCENTIVE FORMULA GRANT PROGRAM 1-2 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/VOITISreport.pdf.
55. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A (2010) (implementing
determinate sentences for all offenses committed after July 1, 1984); DITTON & WILSON, supra
note 2, at 2.
56. SABOL ET AL., supra note 54, at 11 tbl. 1.5.
57. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING: AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL
GRANTS INFLUENCED LAWS IN SOME STATES 6-8 (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/
archive/1998/gg98042.pdf (reporting survey findings indicating that truth-in-sentencing
grants were a key factor in the enactment of tougher sentencing laws only in Louisiana,
Maine, New York, and Oklahoma); see also SABOL ET AL., supra note 54, at 18 (explaining that
the truth-in-sentencing grant program was a major motivating factor for the move to
determinate sentencing in only a few states). 
58. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 57, at 7-8.
59. SABOL ET AL., supra note 54, at 7.
60. Id. at 8 tbl. 1.4.
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federal defendants beginning in 1987,61 and by 2000, sixteen states
had eliminated the possibility of parole for all newly convicted
prisoners.62 Several other states restricted parole eligibility to cer-
tain classes of offenders, such as those convicted of nonviolent
crimes.63 In addition to restricting or eliminating discretionary
parole release, many jurisdictions also reduced opportunities for
early release by imposing restrictions on prisoners’ ability to reduce
the length of their sentences through the accrual of so-called “good
time” and “earned time” credits.64 By the turn of the century, the
“truth-in-sentencing” movement, with its emphasis on minimizing
the discretion of prison officials and parole boards, had succeeded in
restricting or eliminating early release in a majority of states. 
C. Consequences of Increased Incarceration
The decision to imprison more people for longer and more certain
periods of time has had significant consequences. Between 1970
and 2005, the number of people in prison increased more than
sevenfold.65 More than one of every one hundred Americans is now
behind bars and one of every thirty-one is under some form of pre-
or post-sentence correctional supervision.66 
61. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, 2032 (1984) (repealing 18 U.S.C. § 5041). 
62. These states included Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, Washington,
and Wisconsin. DITTON & WILSON, supra note 2, at 3; ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRENDS IN STATE PAROLE, 1990-2000, at 2 (2001), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/tsp00.pdf.
63. DITTON & WILSON, supra note 2, at 3 (listing Alaska, New York, Tennessee, and
Virginia among the states restricting parole eligibility).
64. Notable examples include Texas and North Carolina, in which prisoners served less
than 20 percent of their sentences on average before public outcries led the states to
dramatically reduce the availability of sentence reduction credits. Nora V. Demleitner, Good
Conduct Time: How Much and For Whom? The Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal
Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. REV. 777, 781-82 (2009). 
65. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS PUB. SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC
SPENDING: FORECASTING AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 2007-2011, at 1 (2007), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/State-based_policy/
PSPP_prison_projections_0207.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC SPENDING] (relying
on data from Bureau of Justice Statistics correctional surveys and adult resident population
data from the U.S. Census Bureau). 
66. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 5 (2008),
available at http://pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_2-1-
1_FORWEB.pdf. At year end 2007, the number of persons under correctional control and
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Imprisonment is no longer an experience reserved for a deviant
few: it has become “a pervasive event in the lives of poor and
minority men”67 and is an experience increasingly shared by
women.68 For those who have been imprisoned, the experience has
lasting implications for labor prospects, lifetime earnings, and
educational and housing opportunities.69 Large scale imprisonment
has also had well-documented adverse effects on the larger commu-
nity, altering traditional family structures and contributing to the
destabilization of impoverished neighborhoods.70 A growing body of
research suggests that the numbers of persons confined in prison
has profound effects on the distribution of political power, as well.71 
Although the social and moral costs of mass imprisonment have
drawn serious criticism in academic circles, it is the rapidly es-
calating financial cost of imprisonment that has captured the
attention of policymakers. And with good reason: between 1985 and
supervision ranged from one of every eighty-eight persons in New Hampshire to one of every
thirteen in Georgia. ONE IN 31, supra note 12, at 7.
67. BRUCE WESTERN, MARY PATTILLO & DAVID WEIMAN, IMPRISONING AMERICA 3 (2004);
see also SIMON, supra note 7, at 141 (“The odds of an African American man going to prison
today are higher than the odds he will go to college, get married, or go into the military.”);
Donald Braman, Families and Incarceration, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT 117, 117 (Marc Mauer
& Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (“Under current conditions, well over 75 percent of African-
American men in the District [of Columbia] can expect to be incarcerated at some time in
their lives.”).
68. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS
IN 2005, at 4 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p05.pdf (noting a 57
percent growth in female population from 1995 to 2005 compared to a 34 percent increase for
men during the same period); PUBLIC SAFETY, PUBLIC SPENDING, supra note 65, at 10.
69. See generally AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., URBAN INST., FROM PRISON TO WORK: THE
EMPLOYMENT DIMENSIONS OF PRISONER REENTRY (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/
uploadedPDF/411097_From_Prison_to_Work.pdf (discussing obstacles to employment faced
by persons leaving prison); Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and
Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 541-42 (2002).
70. JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST., FAMILIES LEFT BEHIND: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 7-10 (2005), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
310882_Families_Left_Behind.pdf (discussing ways social service agencies can help former
prisoners surmount barriers to family reunification following imprisonment).
71. Pamela S. Karlan, Conviction and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate
over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1148-49 (2004); Marc Mauer, Mass
Imprisonment and the Disappearing Voters, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 67, at 50,
57; David Hamsher, Comment, Counted Out Twice—Power, Representation & the “Usual
Residence Rule” in the Enumeration of Prisoners: A State-Based Approach To Correcting
Flawed Census Data, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 300-04 (2005) (discussing the Census
Bureau’s method of counting prisoners and its ramifications for political representation).
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2008, national annual correctional expenditures from general funds
alone72 increased from $6.7 billion to more than $47 billion dollars
—an increase of 700 percent.73 Incarcerating a federal prisoner for
one year averages $25,900,74 a figure roughly commensurate with
the annual cost of incarcerating a state prisoner.75 The cost of incar-
ceration is significantly higher for elderly prisoners, whose ranks
have swelled as a result of lengthening sentences.76 Corrections now
consumes one of every fifteen state general fund dollars, making it
the second-fastest growing category of general fund expenditures,
outpaced only by the growing cost of Medicaid.77 
The still-unfolding financial crisis of 2008 has exacerbated
concerns about the growing cost of incarceration. High unemploy-
ment, combined with plummeting real estate values and declining
corporate profits, has resulted in substantial decreases in state tax
revenue over the past three years.78 Diminishing resources have
72. Total state corrections expenditures for fiscal year 2008 totaled $52 billion. NAT’L
ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 54 (2009).
73. Compare KAREN M. BENKER & MARCIA A. HOWARD, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET
OFFICERS, THE STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 8 tbl. 2 (1987), with NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE
BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 54 (2009). These figures do not adjust for
inflation.
74. Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 74 Fed. Reg. 33, 279 (July 10,
2009) (reporting average cost of incarceration for federal inmates in Fiscal Year 2008 as
$25,895). 
75. JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES,
2001, at 1 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf (reporting a
difference of less than $20 between the average annual cost of incarcerating a state prisoner
versus a federal prisoner in 2001); see also JUSTICE POLICY INST., PRUNING PRISONS: HOW
CUTTING CORRECTIONS CAN SAVE MONEY AND PROTECT PUBLIC SAFETY 20 (2009), available
at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_PruningPrisons_AC_PS.pdf (citing
American Correctional Association figures showing an average annual cost of $24,655 per
prisoner in 2006). 
76. Geriatric inmates are the fastest growing age group within federal and state prisons,
and their numbers are expected to continue rising at a rapid rate. CARRIE ABNER, COUNCIL
OF STATE GOV’TS, GRAYING PRISONS: STATES FACE CHALLENGES OF AN AGING INMATE
POPULATION 9 (2006), available at http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/sn0611Graying
Prisons.pdf. On average, elderly inmates cost states three times more than their younger
counterparts. Id. at 10. 
77. CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FISCAL CRISIS IN
CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 3 (2009), available at http://www.vera
.org/files/The-fiscal-crisis-in-corrections_July-2009.pdf (citing data compiled by the National
Association of State Budget Officers).
78. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL
SURVEY OF STATES 23 (2009), available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/FSS0906.PDF.
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forced states across the country to cut back on social services,
eliminate jobs, and lower salaries for state workers.79 And the worst
may be yet to come: as of this writing, state budget deficits are
predicted to last well into the new decade.80 
California has possibly been the state hit most heavily by the
recent financial crisis. As a result of the state’s harsh sentencing
laws, which include one of the most draconian three-strikes laws in
the country,81 and high rates of parole revocation, California’s
prisons were overcrowded long before its current budget woes began.
In 2005, the state’s prison health care system was placed under
federal receivership as a result of constitutionally deficient condi-
tions in its prisons, which were found to be causing the deaths of
more than one inmate a week.82 In 2006, as crowding in the prison
system worsened, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger declared a
“State of Emergency.”83 Proclaiming that “immediate action” was
essential “to prevent death and harm caused by California’s severe
79. NICHOLAS JOHNSON, PHIL OLIFF & ERICA WILLIAMS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, AN UPDATE ON STATE BUDGET CUTS 5-6 (2010), http://www.cbpp.org/ files/3-13-
08sfp.pdf (describing recent cuts in services and jobs and listing pending proposals for
additional cuts).
80. According to Vermont Governor Jim Douglas, Chairman of the National Governors
Association, “State revenues continue to deteriorate, as most states are witnessing monthly
totals lower than their recent forecasts, which have been revised downward.” Robert Pear,
States Have Not Yet Seen the Worst of Economic Times, Governors at Meeting Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 2010, at A16. That assessment is consistent with more formal surveys of the effect
of the budget crisis on state governments. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, RECESSION
CONTINUES TO BATTER STATE BUDGETS 1 (2010), http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-8-08sfp.pdf
(reporting that forty-one states faced budget shortfalls for fiscal year 2011 and predictions
suggest larger shortfalls for fiscal year 2011); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, BEYOND CALIFORNIA:
STATES IN FISCAL PERIL 2 (2009), available at http://downloads.pewcenteronthestates
.org/BeyondCalifornia.pdf (noting that “states historically have their worst years shortly after
a national recession ends, as they cope with higher Medicaid and other safety-net expenses
at the same time revenues lag because of stubborn unemployment”).
81. The California statute does not require that a defendant’s third felony offense be
violent in order to earn him a mandatory indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (2009). The provision has been applied to third-offense cases involving
offenses as minor as the theft of $153 in videotapes. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential but
Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in Prison Reform, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307, 309
(2008).
82. See Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
3, 2005) (declaring the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s medical care
system “broken beyond repair” and ordering it placed under receivership).
83. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency
Proclamation (Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/proclamation/4278.
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prison overcrowding,” the Governor sought to transfer inmates to
out-of-state prisons.84 His efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful,
however, and as a result of the state’s continued failure to remedy
the unconstitutional condition of its prisons, in August 2009 a
federal court ordered the state to produce a two-year plan for
reducing the state prison population by approximately 43,000
inmates.85 Facing an unprecedented $26 billion budget shortfall, the
state is now struggling to alleviate overcrowding while at the same
time reducing its correctional budget. 
Although California presents an extreme example, it is far from
the only state being forced to reduce correctional spending in the
face of increased correctional costs. Facing unprecedented financial
pressures, forty-two states reduced their budgets in 2009 through
both targeted and across-the-board cuts.86 Confronted with the
necessity of cutting funds for higher education and social services to
fund more prison beds, correctional budgets are now being reduced
in some states—even as the cost of maintaining inmate populations
continues to grow. Twenty-five states made cuts in their correctional
programs in 2009.87 Absent significant and as yet unforeseeable
changes in the economy, that number is likely to increase over the
next several years. 
II. WHAT STATES ARE DOING NOW
Practical concerns over managing current correctional costs and
long-term worries over the future of the criminal justice system
have caused many states to begin reexamining the ways in which
criminal cases are handled at every stage, from arrest to punish-
ment. A number of states have formed criminal justice councils
84. Id.
85. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM, 2009 WL 2430820, at
*115-16 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009); see also Carol J. Williams, State Gets Two Years To Cut
43,000 from Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2009, at A1. The United States Supreme Court has
agreed to review the validity of the release order during its October 2010 term. See Orders in
Pending Cases, Schwarzenegger v. Plata, No. 09-1233 (U.S. June 14, 2010), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/09-1233.htm.
86. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, supra note 78,
at 1.
87. Id. at 3 tbl. 1-A. 
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tasked with recommending legislative and administrative reforms.88
Others have commissioned outside reviews and sought advice on
how best to manage growth in their prison populations.89 Regardless
of the method of reexamination, the end result is often the same:
across the country, jurisdictions are beginning to agree that less is
more when it comes to incarceration, particularly when nonviolent
or first-time offenders are at issue. 
Although the methods by which states are attempting to control
burgeoning correctional populations vary tremendously, they can be
divided into two rough categories. First are front-end diversion
efforts, designed to keep low-level, nonviolent defendants out of
the formal criminal justice system or, at the very least, out of
custody. These efforts, which often involve cooperation among law
enforcement, prosecutors, defense counsel, and community service
providers, offer an alternative means of managing offenders, usually
by connecting them to important services, ranging from drug
treatment and mental health care to employment services and
parenting classes. Front-end efforts vary in scope and structure,
encompassing community service sanctions, electronic monitoring,
day reporting centers, problem-solving courts, and restorative
justice initiatives. Because these efforts are designed to increase the
community’s imagination and capacity for noncustodial penalties
and interventions, they hold great promise for breaking the cycle of
overreliance on imprisonment as a primary means of social control.
This Article focuses, however, on developments occurring at the
back end of the criminal justice system. These new efforts, designed
to reduce costs and relieve overcrowding by allowing inmates to
leave prison early, have rapidly gained popularity in the wake of the
current fiscal crisis.
88. SCOTT-HAYWARD, supra note 77, at 10. 
89. The Justice Reinvestment Initiative administered by the Council of State
Governments is one example of a sophisticated outside resource available to state
governments. Program researchers map prison admissions data in participating states,
suggest options for managing prison growth that are tailored to the operation of the state’s
criminal justice system, propose ways in which costs saved on incarceration might be invested
elsewhere with better public safety returns, and help create accountability by designating
outcome measures for the state to track. So far, Arizona, Connecticut, Kansas, Michigan,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont,
and Wisconsin have all obtained varying levels of assistance from the program. For more
information, see Council of State Governments Justice Center, Work in the States, http://
justicereinvestment.org/states (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). 
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A. Methods of Early Release
In order to obtain more immediate cost savings and relief from
overcrowding, many states have begun to question the necessity of
long, predictable prison sentences. Through new legislation, many
states have begun to ameliorate the effects of harsh prison sen-
tences by reintroducing old forms of early release and developing
new methods as well. The most common early release mechanisms
in use today fall into three general categories: increased parole
eligibility, reinstatement or expansion of sentence credit, and
creation of infirmity-based release for geriatric and seriously ill
prisoners. 
1. Expansion of Parole Eligibility 
It is important to remember that the move to determinate
sentencing, while widespread, was not complete. Only fourteen
states abolished parole entirely during the twentieth century.90 The
rest have retained parole eligibility in one form or another, often
constrained by truth-in-sentencing requirements that make
prisoners eligible only after serving significant portions of their
sentences.91 In recent years, many of these states have been able to
mitigate the effects of incarceration by scaling back the time in
custody inmates must serve before becoming parole-eligible. 
One notable example is Mississippi. Beginning in 1995, the state
moved from an indeterminate sentencing system to one in which all
offenders were required to serve 85 percent of their sentences before
gaining parole eligibility.92 This change was heightened by low rates
of parole for eligible inmates.93 As a result, the state’s prison pop-
ulation and correctional budget rapidly grew. Motivated by growing
resource concerns,94 in 2001 the state reauthorized parole for most
first-time nonviolent offenders who had served 25 percent or more
90. See DITTON & WILSON, supra note 2, at 3.
91. Id.
92. MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-138 (2009).
93. JFA INST. & MISS. DEP’T OF CORR., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, REFORMING MISSISSIPPI’S
PRISON SYSTEM 1-2 (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewcenteronthestatesorg/initiatives/PSPP/MDOCPaper.pdf?n=8407.
94.  Id. at 4 (referencing Mississippi’s “past low parole grant rates” of 26 to 32 percent).
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of their sentences.95 This did not solve the problem, however, and by
2007 the state’s correctional budget was more than twice what it
had been in 1994.96 In 2008, therefore, the state expanded early
parole eligibility to all nonviolent offenders.97 These newly imple-
mented changes, designed to eliminate all growth in the prison
population over the next decade, so far appear to be working. Since
2008, the prison population has actually seen a decline, and it is on
track to stabilize with no further growth within the next several
years.98
There are signs that other states may follow Mississippi’s lead.
Early in 2010, West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin proposed
increasing parole eligibility for low risk offenders as part of his
2010-11 budget,99 and the Massachusetts State Senate recently
voted in favor of a bill that would make drug offenders eligible for
parole after serving two-thirds of their mandatory minimum
sentences.100 
2. Sentence Credit
Another common mechanism for accelerating release is sentence
credit. Unlike parole, which requires the individualized consid-
eration of each applicant eligible for release, sentence credit
provides an administrative reduction in sentence that ordinarily
applies automatically to any eligible offender.101 Sentence credit
tends to take one of three forms: good time credit, which applies to
95. MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3 (2001).
96. JFA INST. & MISS. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 93, at 2.
97. MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3 (2008).
98. JFA INST. & MISS. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 93, at 5.
99. Lawrence Messina, Alternatives to Building Prisons Advised, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
Jan. 28, 2010, at 1C.
100. See S. Res. 2210, 2009 Leg., 186th Sess. (Mass. 2009) (providing that eligible drug
offenders “serving a mandatory minimum sentence ... shall be eligible for parole after serving
two-thirds of the minimum term of the sentence if the sentence is to a state prison or after
serving one-half of the minimum term of the sentence if the sentence is to a house of
correction”). The bill has garnered the support of the Massachusetts State Bar Association,
as well as the support of advocacy groups. See Memorandum from the Mass. Bar Ass’n on
Senate Bill No. 2210 (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.massbar.org/ legislative-
activities/mba-memo-on-senate-bill-no-2210 (supporting the bill); Editorial, Allow Parole for
Drug Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1, 2010, at 14 (supporting the bill). As of this writing,
the bill awaits further action in the State House of Representatives.
101. Jacobs, supra note 37, at 224-25.
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inmates who do not violate institutional rules; earned release credit,
which provides prisoners with a reduction in sentence proportional
to time spent in designated programs or activities; or meritorious
good time credit (also called extraordinary good time credit), which
allows prison administrators to reduce prisoners’ sentences for
special reasons.102 Originally designed to reward exemplary service
to the institution, such as preventing escape or saving a guard’s life,
meritorious good time credit has long been used to address excep-
tional institutional needs as well, such as the alleviation of severe
overcrowding.103 All three varieties of sentence credit have been the
subject of recent legislative expansions.104
Historically, good time credit has been awarded liberally in the
states where it is authorized, making its loss more a punishment
than its application a reward.105 In some jurisdictions, the amount
of credit available varies based on an offender’s crime of conviction
or length of sentence. In New Mexico, for example, violent offenders
receive no more than four days credit for every thirty days served,
but most other prisoners receive day-for-day credit on their
sentences.106 In other states, the amount of available credit varies
based upon an offender’s institutional security classification.107 
Changing the amount of good time available to inmates is an easy
way to save money quickly, since even small changes in the amount
of credit available have tremendous financial consequences when
distributed across an entire custodial population. Consequently, in
recent years, Delaware, Louisiana, and Washington have all in-
creased the amount of good time available to persons in custody.108 
102. Id. at 221-22.
103. See id.
104. See generally Jennifer Steinhauer, To Trim Costs, States Relax Hard Line on Prisons,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at A1 (describing cost-saving prison reforms, including expansion
of sentence credit in Kentucky and Michigan).
105. Demleitner, supra note 64, at 783.
106. Id. at 789. See also MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3-704(b) (West 2002) (decreasing
credit accrual opportunities for more serious felons). But see OR. REV. STAT. § 169.110 (2010)
(awarding credit in increasing proportion to sentence length). 
107. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-50-6-3 (2010); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 498.003 (Vernon 2009);
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-199 (2009).
108. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4381 (2010) (increasing maximum monthly amount of
good time for prisoners who have served more than one year in prison); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:571.3(B)(3) (2008) (increasing the maximum number of good time days per calendar
month to thirty-five); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.728(1)(b) (2010) (increasing maximum good
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Even for states that abolished good time during the determinate
sentencing era, the cost-savings associated with the mechanism
have made it increasingly appealing. After repealing good time
provisions as part of the state’s move to determinate sentencing in
1999, last summer Wisconsin re-introduced good time credit, albeit
under a new name: “positive adjustment time,” which is now
available to designated offenders who comply with institutional
expectations.109 In Michigan, the governor is currently backing
legislation that would make good time credit available to inmates
for the first time in more than twenty years.110 
In addition to awarding credit for pure institutional compliance,
many states also authorize prison officials to award sentence credit
for time spent in vocational, educational, and therapeutic programs.
Rehabilitative programs have begun to once again gain credibility
among penologists as a way to reduce recidivism,111 and an increas-
ing number of states have been willing to reward voluntary program
participation with sentence reduction. Today, at least thirty-one
states authorize some form of earned release credit.112 Nevada,
Kansas, Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Mississippi have all recently
expanded their earned release statutes, increasing the amount of
credit available to inmates who successfully complete designated
programs and expanding the number of qualifying programs.113
time credit to 50 percent of an eligible offender’s total sentence length). 
109. WIS. STAT. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009) (providing that misdemeanants and minor nonviolent
felony offenders “may earn one day of positive adjustment time for every 2 days served that
he or she does not violate any regulation of the prison or does not refuse or neglect to perform
required or assigned duties”).
110. Freeing Up Cash by Freeing Prisoners, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 16, 2010, at A1
(describing plan to apply good time credit retroactively, making 5,600 state prisoners “eligible
for release within six months”).
111. In recent years, a growing body of research has debunked the idea that “nothing
works” when it comes to criminal rehabilitation. The question, researchers emphasize, is
“what works?” By engaging in sophisticated program evaluations and replicating only those
with successful outcomes, they argue that successful rehabilitative programming can be
developed both in prison and in the community. See, e.g., Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation
and Treatment Programs, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL 253, 255 (James
Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2002).
112. ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CUTTING
CORRECTIONS COSTS: EARNED TIME POLICIES FOR STATE PRISONERS 1 (2009), available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Earned_time_report_%20NCSL
.pdf?n=6022. 
113. Id. at 3-4.
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Other states have expanded the classes of credit-eligible prisoners114
and removed limits on the amount of credit prisoners may accumu-
late.115 
Finally, a number of states authorize a form of “meritorious good
time credit.”116 Under these extraordinary sentence credit provi-
sions, prison officials are accorded tremendous discretion to reduce
inmates’ sentences for reasons that in practice range from heroic
service to relief from overcrowding.117 Of all forms of sentence credit,
meritorious good time provides prison officials with the most
unguided discretion and therefore is most subject to abuse.118
3. Infirmity-Based Release
As higher numbers of prisoners serve increasingly longer sent-
ences, the number who suffer from terminal conditions and chronic,
degenerative illnesses is also increasing.119 So too is the number of
geriatric inmates, many of whom require extra physical assis-
tance.120 Because imprisonment prevents prisoners from seeking
medical care on their own, the state is constitutionally obliged to
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id. at 4.
116. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-98b (1992) (authorizing up to 120 days credit “as an
outstandingly meritorious performance award ... for exceptional personal achievement,
accomplishment and other outstandingly meritorious performance”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
197.045(3) (West 2006) (allowing credit of up to five days per month “at the discretion of the
commissioner ... for performing exceptionally meritorious service or performing duties of
outstanding importance in connection with institutional operations and programs”); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 209.4465(5) (2009) (permitting up to ninety days credit annually for any offender “who
engages in exceptional meritorious service”). 
117. See Jacobs, supra note 37, at 221-22, 267-68.
118. See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois’s “meritorious good
time push” scandal).
119. Timothy P. Flanigan et al., HIV and Infectious Disease Care in Jails and Prisons:
Breaking Down the Walls with the Help of Academic Medicine, 120 TRANSACTIONS AM.
CLINICAL CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS’N 73, 73 (2009) (observing that prisoners are five times more
likely to have HIV and seventeen to twenty-eight times more likely to suffer from hepatitis
C than the general population).
120. TINA CHIU, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IT’S ABOUT TIME: AGING PRISONERS, INCREASING
COSTS, AND GERIATRIC RELEASE 4 (2010), available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=
2973/its-about-time-aging-prisoners-increasing-costs-and-geriatric-release.pdf (reporting that
from 1999 to 2007 the number of people age 55 or older in state and federal prisons grew 76.9
percent while the number of persons ages 45-54 grew 67.5 percent); see also ABNER, supra
note 76, at 9 (“Elderly inmates represent the fastest growing segment of federal and state
prisons.”).
492 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:465
provide appropriate health care, including medication, doctor’s
visits, medical tests and procedures, durable medical equipment,
physical therapy, and other forms of medical intervention.121 In
addition, when prisoners’ care cannot be met in an institutional
setting, prisons are responsible for securing appropriate community-
based treatment and for providing necessary security on site. As
health care costs rise at unprecedented rates, caring for ill and
elderly inmates has imposed increasing financial burdens on the
states.122 
In response to these concerns and in recognition of the fact that
elderly and seriously ill inmates often pose less of a threat to public
safety than their younger, healthier counterparts, over the past
decade an increasing number of jurisdictions have authorized parole
for the elderly, the infirm, and the seriously ill.123 In jurisdictions
that have retained discretionary parole, these inmates may be
released on a case-by-case basis, either as part of a traditional
parole plan or under special provisions governing parole for inmates
with serious medical conditions.124 The appeal of medical parole, or
“compassionate release,” as it is often called, has caused even some
nonparoling jurisdictions to develop special procedures authorizing
limited early release for seriously ill prisoners serving determinate
sentences.125 Most jurisdictions that authorize medical parole make
release contingent upon a showing that the inmate suffers from a
“debilitating, incapacitating, or incurable medical condition” and
that he poses no risk to public safety.126 Some also include geriatric
121. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
122. CHIU, supra note 120, at 5, 9-10; Mike Mitka, Aging Prisoners Stressing Health Care
System, 292 JAMA 423, 423-24 (2004).
123. As of 2008, at least thirty-six states authorized some form of early release for dying
or seriously ill prisoners. Marty Roney, 36 States Offer Release to Ill or Dying Inmates, USA
TODAY, Aug. 14, 2008, at 4A.
124. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.085 (2005) (authorizing special medical parole for
certain prisoners who develop severe medical or cognitive disabilities during their period of
incarceration); D.C. CODE § 24-464 to -465 (2001) (authorizing medical or geriatric parole for
parole-eligible prisoners who develop permanent disabilities or terminal illnesses, or who are
over sixty-five years of age and chronically ill); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-210 (2009)
(permitting designated inmates with terminal conditions or those requiring extensive medical
attention to be released on parole). 
125. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 24-468 (2009) (providing for medical sentence reduction for
nonparole-eligible inmates who develop permanent disabilities or terminal illnesses while
incarcerated).
126. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:10-a(I) (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-424
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release provisions that allow older inmates to secure early release,
often upon showing that they suffer from medical problems of lesser
magnitude.127 A few release provisions make cost an explicit
consideration, with release contingent on a showing that providing
a prisoner with necessary treatment is excessively costly.128 
Because the cost of providing medical care for seriously ill
prisoners far exceeds the cost of housing healthier prisoners,129
infirmity-based release provisions promise to deliver substantial
cost savings even if utilized on a lesser scale than other, more
generally applicable early release provisions. This is true even in
the case of indigent inmates, whose health care costs in the com-
munity will still be paid for with government dollars.130 
Yet despite these potential cost savings, for a number of reasons,
compassionate release is sparingly utilized. Delays in bureaucratic
review make compassionate release inaccessible to many termi-
nally ill prisoners who often die before completing the application
(2008). 
127. See D.C. CODE § 24-468 (implementing geriatric sentence reduction for nonparole-
eligible inmates over sixty-five years of age with chronic illness). See also VA. CODE ANN. §
53.1-40.01 (2009) (permitting felony offenders to petition for conditional release upon reaching
the age of sixty if the inmate has served at least ten years of his sentence or upon reaching
the age of sixty-five if the inmate has served at least five years of his sentence).
128. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:10-a(I)(b) (stating that medical parole is available only
if “[t]he cost of medical care, treatment, and resources for the inmate is determined to be
excessive”). Corrections officials in New Hampshire have touted the cost savings provided by
the new medical parole provision. In a press release celebrating the first use of the new
statute, Robert J. MacLeod, Administrative Director of the Department of Corrections Medical
and Forensic Services, announced that the parole of inmate Brenda Hewitt would “save the
state of New Hampshire a projected $40,000 in treatment costs,” all of which would be paid
by Hewitt’s private health insurance. Press Release, N.H. Dep’t of Corr., First State Prison
Inmate Paroled Under New Medical Parole Law (Aug. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.nh.gov/nhdoc/news/2004/082404.html. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.728(4)(a)
(allowing secretary of corrections to authorize extraordinary medical placement when, among
other things, “[g]ranting the extraordinary medical placement will result in a cost savings to
the state”). 
129. See, e.g., Lisa Aleman-Padilla, Chowchilla Inmate with Cancer Is Freed:
“Compassionate Release” Called a Way To Cut Costs, FRESNO BEE, Apr. 16, 2003, at B1
(describing a 1995 case in which the California Department of Corrections spent almost
$900,000 to care for and guard a comatose inmate during the last six months of his life).
130. The indigent elderly and disabled ordinarily receive health care through Medicaid
programs, which are funded jointly by the federal government and the states. Prison inmates,
however, are not Medicaid eligible, and therefore states pay the full cost for medical care for
incarcerated persons. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (a)(28)(A) (2006) (barring Medicaid payments on
behalf of inmates of public institutions); 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009 (2009) (same). 
494 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:465
process.131 Another serious impediment to release is the inability of
many prisoners to develop safe and appropriate release plans.
Prison administrators and parole boards are appropriately wary of
“kicking to the curb” seriously ill inmates who may be unable to
access necessary medical and personal care without assistance.132 As
a result of these practical limitations, the use of compassionate
release has thus far been limited despite the recent proliferation of
authorizing legislation.
B. Preliminary Results
It is too early to say with any certainty whether the new legisla-
tion discussed in Part II.A will succeed in lowering inmate popula-
tions and reducing state correctional expenditures. Preliminary
feedback has been limited and is more anecdotal than empirical.133
Even assuming, however, that these popular early release mecha-
nisms are capable of reducing costs in the short run to the degree
state officials anticipate, their long-term sustainability can be fairly
questioned. 
With rare exception, the early release mechanisms share a
common feature: they are controlled by departments of corrections
or parole boards. Allowing executive officials to administer early re-
lease provides several obvious benefits. Prison officials are uniquely
aware of institutional capacity constraints and are therefore well
positioned to award sentence credit or grant early release in ways
that are targeted to the needs of the institution. Consequently,
insofar as new laws are designed to provide relief to prisons in the
131. See Cara Buckley, Law Has Little Impact on Compassionate Release for Ailing
Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A17 (reporting that since 2005, “at least 16 New York
inmates have died while waiting for the parole board to decide their fate”).
132. Placing qualified prisoners in community-based nursing homes is no easy task. As Dr.
Lester Wright, chief medical officer for the New York State Department of Correctional
Services has explained, “We’re ... competing for beds. Some people think my patients aren’t
as valuable as other people in society.” Id. 
133. See JFA INST. & MISS. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 93, at 5 (reporting that Mississippi’s
parole reforms have stabilized growth in what was previously a rapidly expanding prison
population); LAWRENCE, supra note 112, at 5 (presenting Washington State officials’ estimate
that expansion of earned time has saved the state approximately $5500 per prisoner in prison
costs based on a sixty-three-day reduction in sentence).
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form of cost savings and extra bed space, allowing executive
agencies to control release decisions makes sense.134
History demonstrates, however, that executive release decisions
are subject to numerous criticisms. Their sensitivity to institu-
tional concerns often comes at the expense of community worries
about public safety and the legitimacy of sentencing decisions.
Exacerbating lack of public trust is the absence of transparency in
parole board and prison administrative decisions. As detailed above,
these structural deficits strongly contributed to the abolition of
parole and other forms of early release in the 1980s and 1990s.135
In the current move away from wholly determinate sentencing
and toward limited early release, states have paid little attention to
avoiding the mistakes of the past. There is good reason to believe,
however, that the concerns that led to the repeal of early release
legislation in earlier decades have not dissipated over time. In fact,
there are already some indications that the public may not be eager
to embrace the newest rounds of early release legislation.
For example, in December 2002, in response to cost concerns,
Kentucky Governor Paul Patton ordered the early release of 833
minor felony offenders who were nearing release.136 Only one month
later, however, the program was suspended after four newly
released offenders committed several violent crimes.137 Despite the
state’s crushing budget shortfall, Kentucky lawmakers responded
by calling for a swift end to early release—a move that suggests
public safety concerns can quickly overcome support for cost-saving
early release measures.138
134. It should be remembered, however, that authorizing executive officials to release
inmates early does not guarantee that they will do so. In fact, in several states that have
authorized expanded early release, projected cost savings have been exaggerated because
authorized officials have failed to fully utilize their enhanced discretion. See, e.g., CHIU, supra
note 120, at 6, 8 (describing the failure of authorities to utilize their powers under geriatric
release provisions).
135. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
136. V. Dion Haynes & Vincent J. Schodolski, Strapped States Turn to Prisons: Early
Releases Among Saving Options, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 2003, at A8; Public Outrage Halts Release
of Prisoners, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2, 2003, at A16.
137. Public Outrage Halts Release of Prisoners, supra note 136, at A16.
138. See Release of Inmates To Stop; Lawmakers Must Find Funds, CIN. POST, Feb. 1, 2003,
at K1 (“[Although] [t]he release of 883 inmates has been roundly criticized by legislators, law
enforcement and a number of gubernatorial candidates ... [f]ew of them have offered realistic
alternatives for finding the money to pay to house the inmates.”).
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More recently, Illinois has experienced one crisis after another
relating to its early release and meritorious good time programs. In
late 2009, the Associated Press reported on a “secret program” being
implemented by the Illinois Department of Corrections that allowed
inmates to receive large amounts of meritorious good time credit
immediately upon entering the prison system.139 The practice,
known as “meritorious good time push” (or MGT push) was respon-
sible for the early release of more than 1700 inmates convicted of
minor felony offenses, such as battery and drunken driving.140 Many
of these inmates were required to serve mere weeks of their
sentences before being awarded sufficient credit to gain release—a
divergence from the traditional state practice of awarding meritori-
ous good time only to prisoners who had served at least sixty days
of their prison sentences.141 Designed to save the state $5 million a
year, the practice quickly backfired. Within several months’ time,
nine releasees had been charged with new crimes, seventeen had
been returned to prison on allegations of new violent criminal
activity, and thirty-one had been taken into custody on allegations
of nonviolent rule violations.142 Public outrage was swift and vocal,
leading to suspension of the program in December and new
legislation shortly thereafter to restrict prison officials’ ability to
award meritorious good time credit.143 
The fallout from Illinois’s meritorious good time scandal spilled
over into the state’s new early release program, which placed
inmates nearing their release dates in the community under parole-
139. John O’Connor, Illinois Ends Secret Prison-Release Plan, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 15,
2009, at A15 [hereinafter O’Connor, Secret Plan]; Press Release, Governor Quinn Signs Public
Safety Initiative Law (Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/
ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=1&RecNum=8174 (describing new law requiring “prisoners
in state custody to serve at least 60 days of their sentences before being eligible for
meritorious good conduct credit”).
140. Monique Garcia, Quinn Admits Prison Error, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 31, 2009, at A5.
141. John O’Connor, Analysis: Questions Remain About Inmate Release, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Jan. 2, 2010, http://mywebtimes.com/archives/ottawa/print_display.php?id= 394857 (noting
that the “MGT Push” involved “a decision to abandon the Corrections Department’s previous
policy of requiring all inmates to serve at least 61 days before they could be considered for
release”).
142. See John O’Connor, Scores Back in Prison After Ill. Parole Crackdown, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 13, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wirestory?id=9550964. Following an intense
enforcement effort by parole officials in January 2010, 130 more releasees were apprehended
and charged with violating the rules of their supervised release. Id.
143. O’Connor, Secret Plan, supra note 139, at A15; Press Release, supra note 139.
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like supervision.144 First implemented in November 2009, that
program was suspended “pending a review of all early release
programs” in the wake of the MGT push scandal.145
The use of expanded good time and earned release credit in other
states is subject to many of the same criticisms that have driven
opposition to meritorious good time in Illinois. In Michigan, for
example, where Governor Jennifer Granholm is seeking to re-
introduce good time legislation, former prosecutor and current
Oakland County Executive L. Brooks Patterson is leading the effort
to block newly proposed good time legislation. The issue is not new
to him: Patterson successfully led the charge to abolish good time
credit in 1978.146 Now, as then, he and others have objected to the
practice on the ground that it allows criminals to revictimize the
communities in which they were sentenced.147 Whether the new
measure will pass remains to be seen, but this much is clear:
proponents of the proposed legislation have done little to assuage
the long-standing worries that led to the repeal of good time only a
generation ago.148 
As these examples indicate, thus far new efforts to provide for
early release are controlled by executive officials who for the most
part continue to operate in a way that prizes large scale administra-
tive efficiencies over visible, individually justified release decisions.
However, unless early release practices begin to account for public
concerns over the lack of accountability and transparent decision
making that led to the repeal of earlier forms of back-end release,
144. Cheryl Corley, States Release Inmates Early To Cut Prison Costs (Nat’l Public Radio
Dec. 13, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121338571
(describing the early release program and interviewing one of the program’s first releasees).
145. Monique Garcia, 2nd Early Release Program Suspended, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2010, at
8 (reporting suspension of early prison release program designed for nearly one thousand
nonviolent offenders).
146. Patterson: Good Time a Bad Idea, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 16, 2010, at A2.
147. Id.
148. Outside Michigan, the practice of awarding good time credit has not been as widely
criticized as has parole release, perhaps because the link between sentence credit and actual
release is more attenuated. Nevertheless, good time and earned release are subject to many
of the same criticisms insofar as the application of sentence credit turns on the unaccountable
discretion of prison officials. “If anything, good time is conceptually less well grounded than
parole and less susceptible to outside scrutiny. It is also subject to more abuse because prison
officials cannot help but be tempted to use good time to reinforce their institutional authority
and interests, as they define them.” Jacobs, supra note 37, at 270. 
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it is likely that the newest generation of early release legislation
will be short-lived.149 
      III. AN ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM: JUDICIAL SENTENCE       
MODIFICATION
Although the vast majority of early release mechanisms are
implemented by parole boards and prison administrators, not all
are. Judicial sentence modification is an early release mechanism
that permits sentencing courts to reduce inmates’ lawfully imposed
terms of imprisonment when specified criteria have been met.
Unlike a parole decision or the application of sentence credit, a
judge’s decision to modify a sentence is ordinarily made in open
court and on the record in the jurisdiction in which the offender was
originally sentenced. 
While judicial sentence modification is a practice with deep
historical roots, it does not exist in many jurisdictions and is
authorized narrowly in most others. Where the mechanism does
exist, it tends to take one of two forms. In a few jurisdictions, the
power to modify a sentence is believed to arise from the sentencing
court’s inherent power over its own sentence. Although states that
permit sentence modification under this model embrace an expan-
sive concept of the sentencing court’s jurisdictional authority, all
have imposed strict common law limits on courts’ ability to exercise
that power when altering legally imposed sentences.150 A more
common, though still rare, approach permits judicial sentence
modification when the legislature has authorized the practice by
statute. This modern variation on common law sentence modifica-
tion allows legislatures to define the circumstances under which
judges may modify sentences that have already commenced.
Although a number of states and the federal government have
enacted such provisions, most statutes provide only a brief window
149. See Monica Davey, Safety Is Issue as Budget Cuts Free Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2010, at A1 (describing recent problems with public tolerance of new early release legislation
in Illinois, Oregon, and Colorado). It is worth noting that infirmity-based release mechanisms
are less subject to backlash than are sentence credit provisions or parole because the persons
granted compassionate release are ordinarily too ill to pose any risk to public safety and few
will live long enough to garner much attention. 
150. See infra Part III.A.
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during which legal sentences may be altered, thereby limiting their
utility as a means of providing for early release.151 
Despite the limited authorization of judicial sentence modification
in modern practice, in the jurisdictions where courts possess
authority to reexamine sentences, there are indications that they
exercise that power with some regularity. Part III reviews the
history and modern practice of judicial sentence modification before
examining the potential strengths and limitations of the mechanism
as it is, and might be, employed.
A. Historical Roots 
In its earliest form, sentence modification can be traced back to
English common law. In the days when trial courts did not hold
session year-round but instead divided their work into terms, as
many courts of last resort do to this day, the rule was simple: when
a court imposed sentence, or entered any other judicial order, for
that matter, it retained unlimited power to change the disposition
throughout the term in which the order was entered.152 So long as
the term remained in session, the defendant’s sentence could be
altered.153 Once the term expired, however, the court lost jurisdic-
tion over the sentence and could no longer modify any of its lawfully
imposed provisions for any reason.154 
151. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
152. In 1861, the Massachusetts Supreme Court observed, “It seems to have been
recognized as one of the earliest doctrines of the common law, that the record of a court may
be changed or amended at any time during the same term of the court in which a judgment
is rendered.” Commonwealth v. Weymouth, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 144, 145 (1861). The court went
on to quote Lord Coke for the proposition that 
during the term wherein any judicial act is done, the record remaineth in the
breast of the judges of the court, and in their remembrance, and therefore the
roll is alterable during that term, as the judges shall direct; but when that term
is past, then the record is in the roll, and admitteth of no alteration, averment
or proof to the contrary.
Id. (citing EDWARD COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 260 (1797)).
153. See Dist. Attorney v. Superior Court, 172 N.E.2d 245, 247-49 (Mass. 1961)
(summarizing the common law cases on this topic); Inter the Inhabitants of St. Andrew’s
Holborn & St. Clement Danes (1704) 91 Eng. Rep. 514, 515 (K.B.) (“The Court at the Old
Bailey have altered and set aside their judgments ten times at the same sessions.... [T]he
sessions as well as the term is but one day in law.”). 
154. Fine v. Commonwealth, 44 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Mass. 1942). When a sentence was
unlawful, different rules applied. Then, as now, nearly all jurisdictions permitted modification
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Over time, some jurisdictions abandoned the practice of holding
terms at the trial court level.155 In jurisdictions where the practice
of holding terms persisted, many courts began to modify the strict
time limits traditionally associated with the common law rule,
allowing trial courts to rule on timely filed motions for sentence
modification even after the term had come to an end.156 In some
cases, courts held these timely filed motions indefinitely, delaying
modification until years after a defendant had begun serving his
sentence. This practice, which was known colloquially as “bench
parole,” was criticized by prison officials and others who believed it
constituted a judicial interference with the release power of
executively controlled parole boards.157 
In 1946, the federal government enacted the first version of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), a rule that would later
become the model for many state sentence modification provisions.
In its original form, the rule provided that a court could reduce a
at any time to correct an illegal sentence. Steven Grossman & Stephen Shapiro, Judicial
Modification of Sentences in Maryland, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 10 (2003).
155. Although the practice of holding terms at the trial court level has mostly vanished in
modern times, a few southern states retain the practice and consequently adhere to the
common law rule or variations thereof. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 662 S.E.2d 753, 755 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2008) (“A sentencing court has power to modify a valid sentence only during the term of
court in which it was imposed or for up to one year (or 120 days after affirmance following
appeal) under OCGA § 17-10-1(f).”); White v. State, 22 So. 3d 378, 381 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)
(upholding a judge’s exercise of her “‘inherent authority’ to alter a sentence until the regular
term of court expires”). 
156. This practice appears to have grown out of worries that the common law rule gave
unfair advantage to defendants sentenced at the beginning of a court’s term, who had much
longer to file their motions and receive favorable rulings from the court than did defendants
sentenced at the term’s end. See B. Carole Hoffman, Note, Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure: Balancing the Interests Underlying Sentence Reduction, 52 FORDHAM L.
REV. 283, 289-90 (1983).
157. In 1946, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons publicly announced his support
for limiting the amount of time in which courts could alter imposed sentences, explaining that
rules enforcing such limits 
protect[ ] the judge from continual importunities while the man is in the
institution. There is a rule to the effect that if the counsel for the defendant files
a petition for a reduction of sentence and that petition is not acted upon, the
judge can act on it any time, regardless of the expiration of the term of court,
and that has resulted in a good deal of importunities to the judge. It amounts
sometimes to a sort of bench parole, whereby the judge retains the authority to
reduce the sentence after the man has been committed.
Id. at 285 n.8 (citing remarks of James Bennett in proceedings on the enactment of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) held at the New York University School of Law).
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sentence for any reason within sixty days of its imposition, either on
motion by the defense or sua sponte.158 After sixty days, the court
lost jurisdiction over the sentence entirely and could no longer
change its length or conditions, regardless of whether the court’s
term had ended.159 At the time the law was enacted, legislators and
prison officials alike expressed support for the provision, contending
that it would “limit the time within which a court could exercise
control over its judgments, reduce the potential for court infringe-
ment on Parole Commission authority over release determinations,
and eliminate the overloading of court dockets with superfluous
Rule 35(b) motions.”160 Later, the statute was revised to expand the
time for filing motions for sentence reduction from 60 to 120 days
and to clarify that courts were required to rule on motions “within
a reasonable time” after their filing.161 
Beginning shortly after Rule 35(b)’s original enactment, state
courts around the country started to adopt versions of Rule 35. Like
the original federal rule, these state analog statutes provided short
time limits within which sentences could be reduced.162 Even after
the federal system abandoned the original Rule 35(b) as part of its
move to determinate sentencing in the 1980s, most states retained
their analog statutes. As a result, most state courts are authorized
to exercise jurisdiction to modify lawfully imposed sentences for a
brief period ranging from thirty days to one year after a sentence is
lawfully imposed.163
158. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1946).
159. Hoffman, supra note 156, at 291.
160. Id. 
161. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1966) (increasing the time within which the court may act from
60 to 120 days); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1983) (making clear that so long as a defendant’s
motion is filed within 120 days, the court may rule on it within a reasonable time thereafter).
The rule remained substantially static until changes prompted by the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 led to substantial revisions in the statute, making sentence reduction solely a means
of rewarding defendants for offering the United States substantial assistance in criminal
prosecutions. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1991).
162. According to a 2003 survey, five states impose a time limit of 30 to 75 days on motions
for sentence modification, five others impose a 90-day limit, ten states impose a 120-day limit,
and eight states permit modification for a period between 180 days and 1 year. See Grossman
& Shapiro, supra note 154, at 11 nn.78-81 (surveying state statutes).
163. Id. at 11. These time limits are consistent with the American Bar Association’s
Criminal Justice Standards, which advocate providing trial courts with the opportunity to
reduce sentences “for a specific restricted time” after sentence is imposed “to rectify those
judgments that it realizes were excessive” or to respond to “new factual information ... that
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B. Modern Use
Within the states that utilize Rule 35(b) analog statutes, data on
the number of motions filed and granted is extremely difficult to
obtain.164 There is no evidence that such motions are granted with
any regularity, and it is easy to hypothesize why motions filed under
Rule 35 analogs would rarely be successful. Given the brief amount
of time between the original sentencing and the expiration of the
trial court’s jurisdiction to modify under these statutes, it is difficult
to imagine circumstances in which relevant facts or circumstances
would change in a way that would justify a principled alteration in
the original sentence. In fact, the reasons for modifying a sentence
so quickly would seem largely illegitimate. One possible use would
be the mitigation of a sentence in response to public pressure from
supporters of powerful or popular defendants. Another might be the
covert correction of a too-harsh punishment imposed in response to
pressure from victims or media at the time of the original sentenc-
ing. Neither practice should be tolerable: one because it permits
injustice after the fact of sentencing, and the other because it
encourages injustice in the original sentencing decision. In any
event, because decisions granting modification under these analog
statutes are not widely reported, legal scholars have traditionally
overlooked provisions authorizing judicial sentence modification as
a matter of any consequence.
Although it is true that early versions of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 35(b) and its later state analogs represent the most
traditional form of judicial sentence modification, they are not the
only form of the mechanism. While judicial sentence modification
remains a fairly unusual phenomenon, courts and legislatures
across the country have found ways to permit courts to retain
jurisdiction over their sentences beyond the strict time limits pro-
vided by traditional Rule 35(b) statutes. The jurisdictions profiled
alters materially the information base on which sentence was imposed.” ABA: SENTENCING,
supra note 38, § 18-7.1.
164. Because sentence modification under Rule 35(b) analogs is wholly discretionary,
rulings on such motions are rarely appealable and therefore leave no record in appellate case
law. Throughout the country, local counties and parishes maintain their own records of trial
court level proceedings. Most do not track either filings or outcomes related to motions for
sentence modification. 
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in Parts III.B.1-3 have widely varying sentencing policies, statutory
authority, and common law traditions, yet each has chosen to use a
form of judicial sentence modification as one means of providing for
early release. 
1. The Rule 35 Motion Extended: Modification in Maryland
The State of Maryland is in many ways traditional, conferring
jurisdiction on trial courts to modify sentences through its own Rule
35(b) analog, Maryland Rule of Court 4-345. As amended in 2005,
the rule provides that 
[u]pon a motion filed within 90 days after imposition of a
sentence ... the court has revisory power over the sentence
except that it may not revise the sentence after the expiration of
five years from the date the sentence originally was imposed on
the defendant and it may not increase the sentence.165 
The rule further specifies that a court may modify a sentence “only
on the record in open court, after hearing from the defendant, the
State, and from each victim or victim’s representative who requests
an opportunity to be heard.”166 The rule leaves the grounds for
modification wholly to the trial court’s discretion.
Like most Rule 35 analog statutes, the Maryland rule limits the
power of the court to modify an imposed sentence unless the de-
fendant files a motion within a limited time period—in this case,
ninety days.167 However, as the rule itself suggests, Maryland
explicitly condones the practice of “bench parole” by permitting
judges to hold timely filed motions in abeyance for up to five
years.168 Commentators have observed that Maryland’s willingness
to allow judges to act on sentence modification motions “years after
[they are] filed based on facts that were not in existence—or
perhaps even contemplated—at the time of the motion, makes the
Maryland procedure unique” in the modern era.169 Equally unique
165. MD. CT. R. 4-345(e)(1). 
166. MD. CT. R. 4-345(f). 
167. MD. CT. R. 4-345(e)(1).
168. Id.; see also Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 5. 
169. Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 9.
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is the broad discretionary authority enjoyed by Maryland judges
who can, and often do, modify sentences for a wide range of
reasons.170 
Unlike most states, in which judicial sentence modification is a
little known obscurity of sentencing law even to those within the
criminal justice system, in Maryland the practice of judicial
sentence modification has been a topic of ongoing public eval-
uation.171 Politicians, judges, district attorneys, and victims’
advocates have publicly debated its merits and drawbacks, and its
continued existence has been the result of hard-won political
battles.172 Several years ago, as a result of political compromise
between those who favor more certain punishment and those who
support the expansive use of judicial sentence modification, the
state amended Rule 4-345, for the first time placing a limit on the
time in which judges may rule on motions for sentence mod-
ification.173 That limit was not expected to have any significant
practical effect on sentence modification, however, since a survey of
state judges demonstrated that the vast majority of modifications
were made within five years of the original sentencing hearing.174 
Since the amendment took effect in 2004, Maryland trial judges
have continued to exercise broad discretion to modify sentences.
Although counties are not required to track “motions for sentence
reconsideration,” as they are colloquially known, the Maryland
Sentencing Commission does collect data on cases in which
judges reduce the sentences of violent felons.175 Given the fact that
170. In Grossman and Shapiro’s 2003 survey, state trial judges reported modifying
sentences for the following reasons: the offender’s participation in alcohol and drug treatment
or educational programs; payment of restitution; completion of probation; exemplary
institutional conduct; cooperation with law enforcement; performance of community service;
successful rehabilitation; or illness or age. Id. at 39-40. Several judges also indicated that they
had modified sentences to ameliorate the impact of changing parole guidelines. Id. at 40.
171. Id. at 37. 
172. Id. at 1-2. 
173. Compare MD. CT. R. 4-345(e)(1) (2004) (placing a five-year limit on decisions), with MD.
CT. R. 4-345(b) (2003) (placing no time limits on decisions). See generally David P. Kennedy,
The End of Finality, 37 MD. B.J. 24, 26 (2004) (asserting that the new time limit would “serve
the interest of finality” in sentencing). 
174. Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 43 (reporting survey indicating “that a clear
majority of the motions for sentence modification that are granted occur within one year of
the time that the motion is filed” and that “[a]n overwhelming majority of those granted occur
within the first five years after the motion is filed.”).
175. MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, ANNUAL REPORT 39 (2009),
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Rule 4-345 only permits modifications within a five-year window,
violent felons seem unlikely candidates for relief since their
sentences are generally lengthy, their crimes serious, and their odds
of rapid “rehabilitation” often dim.176 It is therefore surprising that
Commission data reveals that Maryland judges granted reconsider-
ation on more than 200 sentences involving 110 prisoners between
2005 and 2009.177 Although this limited data fails to reveal the
degree of sentence reduction or the reasons for modification, it does
demonstrate that prisoners serving sentences for crimes as serious
as first-degree murder, first-degree rape, child sexual assault, and
first-degree assault have successfully obtained sentence modifica-
tions.178 While these statistics do not provide any concrete sense of
how prevalent or widespread the practice of sentence modification
is in cases involving less serious offenses, they suggest that
Maryland judges may be utilizing the mechanism with some
regularity in such cases.179 As of this writing, no further effort has
available at http://www.msccsp.org/Files/Reports/ar2009.pdf (discussing state law that
requires judges to submit worksheets to the Commission for rulings on motions for sentence
modification related to defendants convicted of crimes of violence and indicating the
Commission’s belief that these modifications have been historically underreported).
176. Of course, a judge granting a motion for sentence modification need not authorize the
prisoner’s immediate release. As outlined above, under Maryland law a judge could reduce a
twenty-year sentence to a sentence of ten years, for example, if within the first five years
following sentencing, the prisoner demonstrated that such a reduction in sentence was
deserved.
177. Although Maryland judges are required to report only modifications involving violent
felons, the Commission report includes all judicial sentence “reconsiderations” for which a
worksheet was submitted. While the vast majority of these cases do involve violent felonies,
in each year a limited number of the reported modifications involve crimes that are not
obviously crimes of violence. In the interest of accurate reporting, the figures reported in the
text are those reported by the Commission. Interested readers may wish to examine the
Commission’s reports to see in greater detail the breakdown of offenses for which
modifications were granted and reported. See MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING
POLICY, supra note 175, at 40; MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, ANNUAL
REPORT 33 (2008), available at http://www.msccsp.org/Files/Reports/ar2008.pdf; MD. STATE
COMM’N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2007), available at http://
www.msccsp.org/Files/Reports/ar2007.pdf; MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING
POLICY, ANNUAL REPORT 30 (2006), available at http://www.msccsp.org/Files/Reports/ar2006
.pdf; MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2005),
available at http://www.msccsp.org/Files/Reports/ar2005.pdf.
178. MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, supra note 175, at 40; MD.
STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, supra note 177, at 33.
179. See also Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 3 (concluding, based on the authors’
2003 survey of Maryland judges, “that the overwhelming majority of cases in which the
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been made to circumscribe judges’ authority to modify sentences
under Rule 4-345, and by all appearances, the continued use of
judicial sentence modification in Maryland remains secure. 
2. Inherent Jurisdiction: The Wisconsin Approach
In sharp contrast to Maryland and other states that premise
ongoing trial court jurisdiction on state statutory authority,
Wisconsin is one of the very few states that recognizes sentencing
courts’ inherent power to change and modify their own legally
imposed sentences, even after those sentences have commenced.180
Although Wisconsin statutes provide that defendants must move for
sentence modification within ninety days of sentencing when
contending that their sentences are “unduly harsh,” Wisconsin
courts have held that their statutory time limits govern only the
defendant’s right to be heard by the court—not the court’s discre-
tionary power to hear the defendant’s claims and to modify the
sentence.181 In Wisconsin, therefore, a defendant may move for
sentence modification at any time following the commencement
of his sentence. When the defendant’s motion is filed within the
ninety-day time limit prescribed by statute, the court is obliged to
entertain the motion. After those ninety days have passed, it is
within the trial court’s discretion to deny or hear the motion for
modification.182 
In Wisconsin, motions for sentence modification can be made on
two grounds: (1) that the sentence is unduly harsh, or (2) that the
emergence of a “new factor” justifies modification of the original
sentence.183 Modifications based on an alleged “new factor” must
practice is used are for nonviolent drug and theft offenses”).
180. See Hayes v. State, 175 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Wis. 1970), overruled on other grounds, State
v. Taylor, 210 N.W.2d 873 (Wis. 1973). Nevada is also included in this minority group of
states. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that district courts possess inherent authority
to modify a sentence in the limited context of a sentence “based on a materially untrue
assumption or mistake of fact that has worked to the extreme detriment of the defendant,”
such as when a mistaken sentence “is the result of the sentencing judge’s misapprehension
of a defendant’s criminal record.” Edwards v. State, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (Nev. 1996) (quoting
State v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Nev. 1984)). 
181. State v. Noll, 653 N.W.2d 895, 897-98 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (citing WIS. STAT. §
973.19(1)(a) (1998)).
182. State v. Wuensch, 230 N.W.2d 665, 672 (Wis. 1975). 
183. WIS. STAT. § 973.19 (2008); Noll, 653 N.W.2d at 897-98. 
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conform to strict common law rules governing what may and may
not, as a matter of law, be considered a new factor.184 If a new factor
can be shown to exist, it then falls within the discretion of the trial
court to grant or deny modification of the sentence.185 Often the
dispositive question is based on whether the new factor “frustrates
the purpose of the original sentence.”186 The trial court’s decision to
modify is subject to review for abuse only.187 
Over time, Wisconsin courts have identified specific categories of
fact that may or may not constitute new factors. Facts that do not
qualify include institutional compliance, the completion of rehabili-
tative programming, sentencing disparities between codefendants,
and changes in maximum criminal penalties and classification of
crime severity.188 As a result of these restrictions, the court’s ability
to modify a sentence is more restricted in Wisconsin than Maryland,
even though the court’s jurisdictional authority is inherent and
continuing. Facts that have justified sentence modification include
the correction of “inaccurate or incomplete information” relevant to
the sentence imposed, judicial misunderstanding of relevant law or
184. In order to have an imposed sentence modified under Wisconsin law, a defendant must
show by clear and convincing evidence that a new fact or set of facts exist that constitute a
“new factor.” State v. Franklin, 434 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Wis. 1989). In order to qualify as a new
factor, the fact or set of facts must (1) be considered “highly relevant” to the sentence imposed,
(2) be unknown to the judge “at the time of [the] original sentencing,” and (3) either not have
been in existence at the time of sentencing or have been “unknowingly overlooked by all of the
parties.” Rosado v. State, 234 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Wis. 1975). Whether a new factor exists is a
matter of law, which an appellate court determines de novo. State v. Hegwood, 335 N.W.2d
399, 401 (Wis. 1983).
185. Hegwood, 335 N.W.2d at 401.
186. State v. Michels, 441 N.W.2d 278, 280 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). 
187. Franklin, 434 N.W.2d at 611. 
188. See, e.g., Hegwood, 335 N.W.2d at 402 (holding that a reduction in the maximum
penalty for an offense does not constitute a new factor); State v. Torres, 670 N.W.2d 400, 403
(Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a reclassification of a criminal offense that “would result
in a shorter sentence if the defendant were convicted under the new classification” did not
qualify as a new factor); State v. Champion, 654 N.W.2d 242, 243-44, 248 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that participation in rehabilitative programming is not a new factor); State v.
Toliver, 523 N.W.2d 113, 119 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that disparity in sentencing
between codefendants not a new factor); State v. Krueger, 351 N.W.2d 738, 741-42 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that postsentencing factors relating to rehabilitation, including “remorse,
repentance, cooperativeness and positive change,” do not constitute new factors for
modification purposes). 
508 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:465
the collateral consequences of an imposed sentence, and a defen-
dant’s postconviction cooperation with law enforcement.189
Notably, Wisconsin appellate courts have long used “new factor”
law as a conscious tool to regulate the separation of executive and
judicial power. When the state employed an indeterminate sentenc-
ing system that permitted parole consideration for most prisoners,
the courts excluded from consideration as “new factors” rehabilita-
tive facts considered by the parole board.190 After the state adopted
truth-in-sentencing in 1999, the appellate courts continued to re-
strict trial courts’ power to consider such facts on the ground that
doing so “would turn circuit courts into parole boards, a result that
would change the role of the circuit courts and be inconsistent
with the legislature’s intent” in enacting truth-in-sentencing leg-
islation.191 Although “new factor” law constrains the exercise of
Wisconsin judges’ “inherent power” in ways that prevent sentence
modification from serving as a tool for early release in many cases,
it may well be that the courts’ sensitivity to legislative and execu-
tive sensibilities explains the long-standing political tolerance for
the broad sentencing jurisdiction claimed by Wisconsin courts. 
Neither filings nor grants of motions for judicial sentence mod-
ification are tracked in Wisconsin at either the state or county level;
therefore, it is impossible to tell with any certainty the extent to
which such motions succeed. Although now dated, a study con-
ducted in 1989 by students working in the University of Wisconsin
Law School Frank J. Remington Center’s Legal Assistance to
Institutionalized Persons Project examined the outcomes of more
than one hundred motions for sentence modification filed by the
189. State v. Doe, 697 N.W.2d 101, 105-06 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (postsentencing cooperation
with law enforcement may qualify as a new factor); Meredith Ross, Sentence Modification and
Early Release for TIS Inmates, 13 WIS. DEFENDER 1, 3 (2005), available at http://www.
wisspd.org/html/publications/WdefWinSpr05/SentModEarlyRel.pdf.
190. See, e.g., State v. Ambrose, 510 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that
“post-sentencing conduct is a factor that relates to parole and is properly within the
consideration of the Department of Health and Social Services” (citing State ex rel. Warren
v. County Court, 197 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Wis. 1972))); see also Katherine R. Kruse & Kim E.
Patterson, Comment, Wisconsin Sentence Modification: A View from the Trial Court, 1989
WIS. L. REV. 441, 444, 455-56 (observing that in sentence modification motions brought by law
school clinic from 1978-1987, a policy of noninterference with matter considered by the parole
board “seemed to predominate”).
191. State v. Crochiere, 681 N.W.2d 524, 532 n.13 (Wis. 2004).
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clinic on behalf of Wisconsin prisoners.192 The review examined facts
that correlated with reductions of sentences and described almost
twenty cases in which motions for modification alleging new factors
were granted, on grounds ranging from family needs to illness to
cooperation with law enforcement authorities.193 A recent survey of
supervising attorneys working in the same clinic suggests that
Wisconsin judges may be even more willing to grant appropriate
motions now than they were twenty years ago: the clinic director
estimates that during the past three years, judges granted approxi-
mately half of all motions for sentence modification filed by the
clinic.194 That these motions were filed by a law school clinic with
stringent screening standards, rather than by pro se litigants, may
explain the relatively high grant rate; however, insofar as the study
remains descriptive of Wisconsin practice, it suggests Wisconsin
judges continue to exercise their power to modify sentences within
the confines of “new factor” law. 
3. Shared Decision Making: The Federal Model
Within the federal code, several statutes authorize judges to
modify lawfully imposed sentences under certain conditions.195
One of these, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), is an obscure provision
that permits judicial modification of federal sentences for “extraor-
dinary and compelling reasons.”196 Although the law places release
192. Kruse & Patterson, supra note 190, at 441, 444 & n.9.
193. Id. at 444-45, 457-59.
194. Telephone Interview with Meredith Ross, Clinical Dir. of the Univ. of Wis. Frank J.
Remington Ctr. (Mar. 9, 2010).
195. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) (authorizing modification of a sentence “to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (permitting court to reduce sentence if the
defendant has provided substantial assistance to the government). 
196. Previously codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g), this statute provides that although a court
may not ordinarily modify a term of imprisonment, 
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, may reduce
the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised
release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of
the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in
section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that 
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction. 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A court may also reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A) if 
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decisions in the hands of sentencing courts, it puts a powerful
constraint on the court’s ability to exercise its discretion. Before a
court may reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the Bureau of
Prisons must file a motion requesting sentence reduction and
attesting to the extraordinary and compelling circumstances that
justify the change in sentence.197 A defendant may not initiate the
motion himself, nor can a court reduce a sentence sua sponte.198
Under this model, judicial sentence modification is the final step in
a multibranch decision-making process that begins in the prison
and ends in the courtroom.199 
Traditionally, the Bureau of Prisons has exercised its authority
to file motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A) only in rare instances involving
inmates with less than one year to live.200 Prompted in large part by
pressure from advocacy groups that asserted the Bureau was
abusing its discretion by interpreting the statute too narrowly,201 in
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age [or] has served at least 30 years in
prison ... for the [crime] for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a
determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the
defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community ...
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). Finally, a court may modify an imposed term of imprisonment
as provided by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or when appropriate
following a retroactive change in the Sentencing Guidelines range. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B),
(c)(1)(B)(2). 
197. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (when prisoner meets specified conditions, “the court, upon
motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, may reduce the term of imprisonment”)
(emphasis added).
198. See id.
199. Between those two places, the request must surmount numerous hurdles. Under
federal regulations, as outlined in Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 5050.46, requests
for so-called “compassionate release” must be submitted to the warden of the institution
where the prisoner is confined, either by the prisoner himself or by a third party. William W.
Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Reexamination of the Justifications for
Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850, 862-64 (2009) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 571.61(a) (2008)).
If, after investigating the request, the warden supports the application, he may refer it to the
Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons, who may then in turn refer it to the General
Counsel of the Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 864. From the General Counsel’s Office, the
application travels to the Medical Director or Assistant Director of the Correctional Programs
Division, and then to the Bureau of Prisons Director himself for a final decision. 28 C.F.R. §
571.62; Berry, supra, at 864-65. If the Director offers his approval, the U.S. Attorney’s Office
is then contacted and asked to file a motion for sentence modification in district court. 28
C.F.R. § 571.62.
200. Berry, supra note 199, at 852-53, 866. 
201. See Proposed Guidelines Amendment on Reduction of Term of Imprisonment Based on
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2007 the United States Sentencing Commission amended its
guideline on the use of § 3582(c)(1)(A).202 The amendment clarified
the Sentencing Commission’s understanding that “extraordinary
and compelling reasons exist” not only in cases involving terminally
ill patients, but also when a defendant “suffer[s] from a permanent
physical or medical condition, or is experiencing deteriorating phys-
ical or mental health because of the aging process, that substan-
tially diminishes [his] ability ... to provide self-care within the
environment of a correctional facility and for which conventional
treatment promises no substantial improvement.”203 The Commis-
sion also explained that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist
when “the defendant’s only family member capable of caring for the
defendant’s minor child or minor children” dies or becomes incapaci-
tated.204 The Commission made clear that these examples were not
exhaustive, and that extraordinary and compelling reasons other
than those delineated might warrant the filing of a motion for
sentence modification.205
These recent developments suggest the possibility of an expand-
ing role for judicial sentence modification in the federal system.
Since the passage of the 2007 amendments, however, the Bureau
appears to have steadfastly adhered to its prior use of the federal
statute: it appears not to have sponsored any motions for sentence
modification involving nonterminally ill inmates.206 Even in cases
involving seriously ill inmates, the Bureau has exercised its power
sparingly. Of the cases that reached the Bureau’s Central Office
between 2000 and 2009, approximately thirty-five petitions each
year were filed; an average of seven each year were denied and an
average of five were never acted upon because the eligible inmate
died while awaiting a decision from the Bureau.207 
Bureau of Prisons Motion Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(I): Hearing Before the U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n (Mar. 15, 2006) (statement of Margaret Colgate Love on Behalf of the
American Bar Association), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/03_15_06/ MargLove-
testimony.pdf.
202. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. (2007).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. Stephen R. Sady & Lynn Deffebach, Second Look Resentencing Under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c) as an Example of Bureau of Prisons Policies That Result in Overincarceration, 21 FED.
SENT’G REP. 167, 168 (2009).
207. Statistics provided by Judi Garrett, Bureau of Prisons Deputy Assistant Director for
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The Bureau’s ability to effectively bar the courtroom door to the
relief potentially afforded by § 3582(c)(1)(A) demonstrates the
potential limits of the shared decision-making model. Although it
would be highly desirable to achieve agreement among all three
branches of government on the circumstances that justify judicial
sentence modification, in practice shared decision-making provisions
run the risk of allowing the executive branch to unilaterally block
all access to the court. When executive branch officials are unwilling
to exercise their discretionary power in accordance with the intent
of the legislature, as Bureau of Prison officials appear to be doing
with respect to § 3582(c)(1)(A), courts remain helpless to address the
circumstances in which the legislature intended their judicial power
to be exercised.208
4. A New Approach: The Draft Model Penal Code’s “Second
Look”
 In addition to the working models of judicial sentence modifica-
tion offered by jurisdictions such as Maryland and Wisconsin, and
by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), another, more innovative, model may
be forthcoming. The most recent discussion draft of the revised
Model Penal Code: Sentencing, presented to the American Law
Institute in May 2010, contains two judicial “second look” provisions
that would authorize courts to reduce legally imposed sentences.209
The first provision closely tracks the federal statute by authorizing
sentence reduction at any time based on age, infirmity, or extraordi-
Policy, and compiled by Margaret Colgate Love (August 2009) (on file with author).
208. Of course, while the Bureau of Prison’s refusal to exercise its full authority to file
petitions under § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides a cautionary lesson, it is possible that state
correctional authorities would be willing to exercise gatekeeping authority more robustly than
their federal counterparts. That assumption underlies the proposed inclusion of a gatekeeping
clause in a new Model Penal Code provision currently under consideration by the American
Law Institute. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.7 note (Discussion Draft No. 3,
Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter MPC: SENTENCING] (“[T]he MPCS provision assumes that
departments of corrections in the states will exercise their authority more frequently than
their federal counterpart. State correctional agencies experience budgetary pressures
unknown in the federal system, have more diverse offender populations, and should be more
willing to advocate for the release of inmates whose continued confinement serves no
demonstrable purpose.”); Part III.B.4.
209. MPC: SENTENCING, supra note 208, § 305.6-.7. 
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nary and compelling circumstances, upon recommendation of a
gatekeeping correctional authority.210 
The second, and more novel, provision is proposed section 305.6,
which would allow a judicial decision maker or judicial panel to
reduce the sentence of prisoners who have served fifteen or more
years of any sentence of imprisonment when, “in light of current
circumstances, the purposes of sentencing ... would best be served
by ... a modified sentence.”211 In other words, rather than restricting
use of this provision to a short window following sentencing using
the old Rule 35(b) model, the Model Penal Code prohibits use of the
provision until fifteen years after sentencing.212 This restriction
suggests that proposed section 305.6 is designed to be used in cases
involving serious crimes that have drawn lengthy terms of confine-
ment as a way of allowing the court to reassess the continued
propriety of extended confinement.213 Commenting on an ear-
lier—but, in this respect, substantially similar—draft of proposed
section 305.6, Professor Richard Frase has explained that justifica-
tions for reducing a sentence under the draft provision might range
from success in treatment programs to advances in technology that
might permit an offender’s safe return to the community.214 The
proposed provision would also grant the judicial decision maker
discretion to appoint counsel for indigent applicants and require
that notice be provided to the prosecuting authority and to the
victims of the offenses for which the offender is incarcerated.215
Decision makers would be required to maintain an “adequate record
of proceedings,” along with “a statement of reasons” for all modifica-
tion decisions.216 Finally, applicants would have access to discretion-
210. Id. § 305.7(1).
211. Id. § 305.6(4). By inviting reconsideration of the purposes of sentencing, proposed
section 305.6 appears to authorize de novo review of all sentences longer than fifteen years. 
212. Id. § 305.6(1).
213. Id. § 305.6 note (“Proposed § 305.6, which has come to be known as the ‘second-look’
provision, has no close precedent in the existing legislation of any state. It expresses a policy
view that, many years into a prisoner’s service of an extremely long prison term—§ 305.6
selects the 15-year mark—there should be a mechanism to reassess and, potentially, to modify
the prisoner’s original sentence.”).
214. Richard S. Frase, Second Look Provisions in the Proposed Model Penal Code Revisions,
21 FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 197 (2009).
215. MPC: SENTENCING, supra note 208, § 305.6(3), (6). 
216. Id. § 305.6(7).
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ary court review, although it is not clear what standard of review
would apply on appeal.217
Given the degree to which proposed section 305.6, which the
Institute designates “Principles for Legislation” rather than a model
statute,218 fails to take a position on fundamental matters such as
the importance of a public hearing prior to modification, it would be
overreaching to call it a new model for judicial sentence modifica-
tion. Along with proposed section 305.7, it marks the first time the
Model Penal Code has recognized the legitimacy of “second look”
provisions that provide an opportunity to reassess the propriety of
continued imprisonment. Although it is not clear whether this
provision will be adopted in the final revision of the Model Penal
Code as it is currently drafted, its mere inclusion demonstrates a
new openness to judicial involvement in early release decision
making. The Model Penal Code’s inclusion of proposed sections
305.6 and 305.7, if ultimately adopted by the American Law
Institute, may prove influential in prompting jurisdictions to pass
new legislation authorizing the practice of judicial sentence
modification.219
C. Advantages of Judicial Sentence Modification  
As the models described in Part III.B demonstrate, jurisdictions
wishing to provide a judicial forum for sentence modification may do
so in a variety of ways. New legislation might differ among jurisdic-
tions with respect to the offenders eligible for modification, the
minimum or maximum time in which a motion must be entertained,
the circumstances that might justify modification, and the degree to
which the opinions of interested parties or correctional authorities
might factor into the decision to grant modification. Beyond those
basic differences, states might make different choices regarding
217. Id. § 305.6(8).
218. Id. § 305.6 note (“It has not proven possible to couch the provision in model statutory
language; rather, the current draft takes the form of ‘principles for legislation.’”). 
219. Cf. Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge
of the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297, 297 (1998) (commenting on the persuasive force
of the original Model Penal Code and noting that “[i]n the first two decades after its
completion in 1962, more than two-thirds of the states undertook to enact new codifications
of their criminal law, and virtually all of those used the Model Penal Code as a starting point”
(citing Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES xi (1985))).
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whether to provide counsel—an unlikely but possible choice—and
whether to permit appellate review of modification decisions.
However the authorizing legislation is structured, certain funda-
mental features distinguish it from more traditional methods of
early release. When discussing judicial sentence modification, this
Article defines the mechanism by the following key characteristics:
(1) the petitioner is required to seek modification in the original
sentencing court; (2) interested parties are given notice and
opportunity to be heard prior to any decision to modify; (3) before
modification is granted, the court holds a public hearing in open
court; and (4) the judge is required to provide a reasoned, on-the-
record explanation for any decision to modify. 
The possible advantages of judicial sentence modification are
many. First, unlike the application of sentence credit or the decision
to parole, judicial sentence modification decisions are transparent,
occurring in open court and accompanied by an on-the-record
explanation. Moreover, because the mechanism invites the original
sentencing court to consider whether an offender may be safely
returned to the community at a time earlier than originally
anticipated, judicial sentence modification has the potential to
enhance both offender accountability (by requiring the offender to
justify his early release to the court and community that sentenced
him) and judicial accountability (by checking the judge’s original
assessment of the proper sentence against the reality of the post-
sentencing experience). Transparency and accountability are char-
acteristics that respond directly to the concerns that led to the
abolition of parole and other forms of early release in the 1980s and
1990s; therefore, to the degree they can be fully realized through the
mechanism of judicial sentence modification, these advantages
suggest the mechanism is worthy of greater consideration.
1. Transparency 
One of the distinguishing features of judicial sentence modifica-
tion is the transparency that accompanies a judge’s decision to
reduce a sentence. Although no jurisdiction that currently utilizes
judicial sentence modification requires a hearing on every motion
filed, when a court determines that a motion may have merit,
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ordinarily a hearing will be scheduled.220 Under most state laws,
such hearings must be preceded by notice to the district attorney
and to any victims who have requested notification of post-sentenc-
ing proceedings.221 These parties are then given opportunity to voice
their support for, or objection to, the motion for modification either
in writing or in person at the hearing.222
It is easy to imagine cases in which a hearing will be merely
perfunctory, such as when a request for modification of a victimless
crime is unopposed by the local prosecutor. Other cases may involve
more extended proceedings, with competing testimony from lay
witnesses or even experts. Regardless of how simple or complex the
hearing may be, its salient feature is its visibility. Unlike parole
hearings, which are held within prison walls and are ordinarily
closed to the public,223 sentence modification hearings occur in open
court, providing not only interested parties but any interested
person with an opportunity to witness the decision-making process.
Although there is no reason to believe that the public will necessar-
ily avail itself of the opportunity to participate in sentence modifica-
tion hearings, the openness with which proceedings are conducted
provides a powerful contrast to the oft-criticized inaccessibility of
traditional back-end release decisions. 
Equally important to the transparency of judicial sentence
modification is the requirement that judges explain any decision to
modify. Requiring judges to give an explanation of the decision to
modify provides the parties and the public with a measure of
confidence that the decision is a deliberative one that rests on
220. See, e.g., MD. CT. R. 4-345(f) (“The court may modify ... a sentence only on the record
in open court, after hearing from the defendant, the State, and from each victim or victim’s
representative who requests an opportunity to be heard. The defendant may waive the right
to be present at the hearing.... If the court grants the motion, the court ordinarily shall
prepare and file or dictate into the record a statement setting forth the reasons on which the
ruling is based.”).
221. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.088(e), (g) (2010) (requiring notice to the victim and
directing the court to “consider the victim’s comments ... when relevant, and any response by
the prosecuting attorney and the person filing the motion”); MD. CT. R. 4-345(e)(2) (requiring
the state to notify victims of sentence reduction hearings); see also ABA: SENTENCING, supra
note 38, § 18-7.1(b) (requiring notice to the parties prior to sentence reduction).
222. See supra notes 220-21.
223. There are a handful of states that permit members of the public to attend parole
hearings assuming they meet security regulations for entering the prison. See, e.g., Open
Parole Hearings Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-28-501 to -505 (West 2010).
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legitimate considerations. Scholarship in the area of procedural
justice teaches that individuals’ perceptions of the legitimacy of
government action are influenced more by the fairness of the
procedures used by decision makers than by the outcome reached in
any given case.224 This line of research demonstrates that when
individuals encountering the criminal justice system—or any
system, for that matter—feel “heard” and perceive institutional
decision makers as unbiased, trustworthy, and respectful, their
perceptions of the legitimacy of the system tend to increase.225 By
analogy, interested parties witnessing a judge’s transparent,
reasoned decision to reduce a sentence may actually increase their
respect for the court’s legitimacy. Such a result has no analog
among the prison-based forms of early release currently in vogue.
2. Public Accountability 
Beyond transparency, judicial sentence modification has an
additional advantage that traditional mechanisms for early release
lack: if well-implemented, it has the potential to enhance account-
ability for both the offender and the sentencing court. 
Placing the release decision in the jurisdiction where the of-
fender’s crime occurred not only allows interested parties and
community members access to the proceedings; it also invites the
offender to revisit in a concrete way his offense and the community
in which he committed it. Although there inevitably will be some
cases in which judges will be willing to reduce short prison sen-
tences based solely on an assessment that the original sentence was
unduly harsh, it is probable that in the vast majority of cases, the
judge will require the offender to justify a modification of sentence.
In such cases, an offender seeking early release must be prepared
to do more than show that he meets any statutory prerequisites for
release. He must also convince the court that he can return home
224. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
65-72 (1988); see also Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459,
461, 478-79 (2009) (drawing on Tyler’s work to explain that offenders’ respect for the law can
be enhanced by requiring judges to give reasons for the sentences they impose). 
225. Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice:
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 747-48
(2003).
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safely in less time than originally deemed appropriate. To do so, he
will have to confront practical questions about where he will live
and how he will occupy himself following release, as well as more
difficult questions about whether he has been punished sufficiently
for his crime, and why the community should feel confident that, if
released, he will be unlikely to return to prison soon thereafter.
Preparing plausible answers to these questions requires a level of
engagement from the offender that enhances his accountability to
the community by requiring him to proactively develop a plausible
plan for his safe return home.226 
The potential for offender accountability is an important feature
of judicial sentence modification, but even that advantage is minor
compared to the mechanism’s potential for enhancing judicial
accountability. While most forms of early release allow paroling
authorities with no connection to the community to make release
decisions, motions for judicial sentence modification return the
prisoner to the court that confined him, thereby connecting the
release decision to the original decision to imprison. Judges re-
viewing potentially meritorious motions for modification will be
forced to confront the reasons for the original sentencing decision:
not only the offense itself, but also the purposes identified for the
punishment imposed. Periodically, the court may discover that the
assumptions underlying its rationale were faulty. 
Imagine that a sentencing judge believes an offender is an
incorrigible drug addict who can only be prevented from abusing
drugs by being incapacitated in a custodial setting. While in prison,
it is discovered that the defendant is not addicted to drugs at all;
rather, he suffers from a mental illness and, when treated with
226. Although many offenders prepare parole release plans in advance of their parole
hearings, such plans often lack specificity of the sort local judges may require. An offender’s
promise to secure treatment through a local charity may be well received by a statewide
parole board but vigorously challenged by a local judge who knows the services the agency
provides are not those the offender needs. Situating the release decision at the community
level is likely to require the offender to make his case with a greater level of specificity.
Ideally, of course, the offender would not be forced to devise such a plan unaided but would
be able to secure assistance from social workers or reentry coordinators trained to work with
inmates on issues of release planning. Such assistance is becoming increasingly common as
federal funds are made available to assist in the development and implementation of reentry
planning programs. See generally Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, § 3(a)(5)-
(6), 122 Stat. 657, 658 (2008) (authorizing transitional services for prisoners reentering the
community). 
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proper medication, he functions normally. Or perhaps the court
rightly believes the offender is a drug addict and imposes a substan-
tial sentence believing it will provide the defendant with time to
receive intensive drug treatment in prison. In reality, however, the
treatment slots have been cut in the wake of budget shortfalls and
only those prisoners nearing their release date are being admitted
to the drug treatment program. In either case, a court ruling on a
motion for sentence modification will be confronted with a discrep-
ancy between the assumptions on which its sentence was based and
the reality that followed. By inviting the sentencing court to revisit
the original sentencing decision in light of post-sentencing realities,
judicial sentence modification provides the sentencing court with
the opportunity to reassess, in light of more accurate information,
whether the original sentencing decision was just and whether it
entailed a prudent allocation of costly correctional resources. 
Of equal if not greater importance, the accountability fostered by
judicial reconsideration of sentences has great potential to spill over
into front-end sentencing decisions. Ordinarily, the criminal justice
system provides no feedback loop informing judges of what happens
to defendants after sentencing. With limited exception, the pro-
nouncement of sentence is the judge’s last word on the matter;
regardless what follows, there is no mechanism that later disabuses
her of any misconceptions she may have with respect to a particular
offender or to the operation of the prison system more generally.
Judicial sentence modification therefore could provide a valuable
way for judges to hear “the rest of the story.” Information thus
gained might well affect not only early decisions, but front-end
sentencing decisions, too. Over time, these front-end effects could be
significant, particularly for judges who find they have overestimated
the amount of confinement necessary to accomplish the purposes for
which a sentence was imposed. Because judicial sentence modifica-
tion holds the potential to change durations of confinement for both
those already sentenced and those whose sentences have yet to be
imposed, it is a mechanism that legislatures wishing to expand
early release options ought to consider seriously.227 
227. As Todd Clear and James Austin have emphasized, “[T]he total number of prisoners
behind bars is purely and simply a result of two factors: the number of people put there and
how long they stay.” Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration:
Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 308 (2009).
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3. Sustainability 
While more popular early release mechanisms such as good time
credit and earned release are capable of providing immediate, large
scale relief to overcrowded prison systems, phenomena such as
Illinois’s recent failed experiment with early release suggest that
mechanisms that lack accountability are unlikely to maintain public
support over time.228 It would be naïve, of course, to suggest that
judicial sentence modification is a panacea, capable of solving the
problem of mass incarceration and impervious to public backlash.
As a matter of political reality, all mechanisms for early release are
vulnerable to repeal any time a releasee commits a new crime.229 
Nevertheless, judicial sentence modification may have an advan-
tage over other mechanisms in this regard. Because executively
controlled release decisions provide no formal opportunity for public
objection before a release decision is made, public outcry may be
greater when the decision has unhappy consequences. Judicial
sentence modification, on the other hand, provides the public with
an opportunity to resist release before modification is granted.230 For
that reason, it is possible that judges—particularly those who are
elected—may be hesitant to release large numbers of persons from
custody early, especially in the absence of clear guidance regarding
the circumstances the legislature believes would justify early
release. For states eager to save large sums of money by lowering
prison populations quickly, that may not be welcome news. 
Yet the very factors that prevent judicial sentence modification
from providing large-scale, rapid release are the same factors that
suggest it may have more long-term sustainability than more pop-
ular early release mechanisms. Judges may hesitate to release
Only by affecting one or both of these factors can the prison population be reduced. If the
practice of judicial sentence modification were to alter judges’ front-end sentencing decisions,
then the mechanism could have direct (on the back end) and indirect (on the front end) effects
on the length of confinement. 
228. See supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
230. Availing the public of a forum in which to voice opposition before an offender’s
sentence is modified may not shield decision makers from later criticism should the released
person commit new crimes. That is true even when no one voiced serious objections to
modification at the time the decision was made. Such a fact would, however, provide a
decision maker with a respectable response to any such criticism. 
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offenders whose crimes justified imprisonment in the first instance,
but when they do, they are likely to do so after thoughtful delibera-
tion, having weighed the individual characteristics of the offender
and the nature of the crime for which he has been imprisoned, as
well as having given due consideration to the likely effect of release
on public safety. Such decisions, particularly when made on the
record in open court, may well possess a legitimacy that executively
controlled mechanisms for early release lack.
These differences may explain why states that have traditionally
utilized sentence modification have done so consistently, even
during the height of determinate sentencing when back-end forms
of release were considered most suspect. Wisconsin is a good
example: although it abolished parole and good time credit in 1999,
it never abandoned the practice of sentence modification or imposed
any legislative restrictions on its use.231 To the contrary, so positive
was the state’s experience of judicial sentence modification that it
has continued to experiment with legislative mechanisms that
expand judicial sentence modification for prisoners meeting
established criteria.232 For states committed to using early release
as a tool for reducing prison populations over the long run, judicial
sentence modification is, at the very least, a promising mechanism
worthy of greater consideration. 
D. Potential Limitations of Judicial Sentence Modification
As Part III.C illustrates, the judicial character of the sentence
modification mechanism distinguishes it from other forms of early
release. That feature makes sentence modification in many ways
more akin to resentencing than to parole, and gives rise to unique
legal, practical, and structural considerations that merit further
discussion. 
1. Constitutional Constraints
The first question that must be answered is whether the mecha-
nism is legal. Although neither federal nor state courts have held
231. See supra notes 62, 191 and accompanying text.
232. See WIS. STAT. § 973.195 (2008).
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that constitutional considerations bar all forms of sentence modifi-
cation, the practice does have important constitutional implications
with which jurisdictions have been forced to grapple. First is the
effect of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy
on the sentencing options available to modifying courts. Second is
whether and how the separation of powers doctrine, particularly as
enshrined in state constitutional law, affects the manner in which
release authority is allocated between the judicial and executive
branches.
a. Double Jeopardy
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”233 This clause has been held to
guard not only against retrial for an acquitted offense, but also to
“protect[ ] against multiple punishments for the same offense.”234
Although the Supreme Court has not had occasion to confront the
double jeopardy implications of sentence modification directly, the
Court has noted with seeming approval the common law practice of
permitting modifications of any sort—that is, higher or lower—
during the original term of court, prior to the commencement of
sentence.235 These modifications were not governed by protections
similar to those attending the right to be free from retrial following
acquittal. 
The Supreme Court has not directly held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause itself would bar an increase in the imposition of
233. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
234. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). 
235. In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 133-34 (1980), the Court was asked to
decide whether a new federal statute permitting the government to appeal a defendant’s
sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by permitting an appellate court to vacate the
defendant’s original sentence and remand for imposition of a harsher sentence. In holding
that “[t]he double jeopardy considerations that bar reprosecution after an acquittal do not
prohibit review of a sentence,” the Court relied heavily on the common law, which permitted
trial courts to increase as well as decrease sentences during the same term of court. Id. at
133-34, 136 (citing Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 167 (1873); 3 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES § 438 (13th ed. 1789)). Indeed, the Court went so far as to note that the common
law “accounts for the established practice in the federal courts that the sentencing judge may
recall the defendant and increase his sentence, at least (and we venture no comment as to this
limitation) so long as he has not yet begun to serve that sentence.” Id. at 134.
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a legal sentence that has already commenced; however, it has
suggested as much in dicta.236 In United States v. Benz, the Court
cited a line of authority suggesting that a court loses power to
increase a sentence once service has commenced even during the
same term of court, and explained that the rule “is not based upon
the ground that the court has lost control of the judgment in the
latter case, but upon the ground that to increase the penalty is to
subject the defendant to double punishment for the same offense” in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.237 Therefore, although
“[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not provide the defendant with
the right to know at any specific moment in time what the exact
limit of his punishment will turn out to be,”238 at the same time,
most jurisdictions agree that once a legal sentence has commenced,
increasing it would be improper.239 What constitutes the commence-
ment of the sentence varies widely, however, ranging from oral
pronouncement of sentence by the court to arrival at the prison
where a custodial sentence will be served.240 In a few states,
increases in sentence are permitted so long as they occur with
“reasonable promptness”—usually interpreted to mean a time
period within hours of the original sentence pronouncement.241 
Notably, there appear to be no reported cases of any court
increasing a sentence following a motion for modification, and for
good reason: judicial sentence modification has traditionally been
used solely as a means of reducing the term of a custodial
sentence.242 Although that fact substantially diminishes the risk of
double jeopardy violations, it does not wholly eliminate them. As
one commentator has observed, double jeopardy concerns might
arise in the context of sentence modification if a term of imprison-
ment were modified to a term of release with extensive conditions
236. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1931).
237. See id.
238. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 137. 
239. Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Power of State Court, During Same Term, To Increase
Severity of Lawful Sentence—Modern Status, 26 A.L.R. 4th 905, § 3 (1983). 
240. Id. §§ 7-8. 
241. Id. § 4. 
242. See, e.g., ABA: SENTENCING, supra note 38, § 18-17.1(a) (“The rules should restrict the
time for reduction in severity of a sentence to a specified period after imposition of a sentence.”)
(emphasis added); id. § 18-17.2(b) (“The rules should provide that any modification of the
requirements or conditions of a sentence under this authority may not increase the overall
severity of an offender’s sentence.”).
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or, even more plausibly, if the terms of a conditional release
sentence were changed in a way that appeared more onerous.243 To
avoid such problems, legislators would do well to specify that
sentence modification be used only to reduce sentence length in the
context of custody or to reduce the severity of conditional supervi-
sion, absent consent from the defendant to the imposition of more
onerous requirements.244 
b. Separation of Powers
A second constitutional consideration implicated by the practice
of judicial sentence modification is the doctrine of separation of
powers. Traditionally, in both the state and federal systems, the
judiciary has been responsible for imposing sentences while
executive branch agencies have had sole responsibility for imple-
menting the sentences once imposed. Early challengers to the
practice of sentence modification therefore contended that allowing
the court to modify an already-imposed sentence impermissibly
intruded on the executive powers of pardon and commutation, which
determined the manner and degree to which a sentence would or
would not be implemented.245
In 1931, the Supreme Court addressed that argument in United
States v. Benz.246 In that case, a defendant was sentenced to ten
243. Frase, supra note 214, at 199 (suggesting that if the “old and new sentence are not
directly commensurate,” to avoid double jeopardy problems it would be “necessary to devise
equivalency scales covering different sentence types”). 
244. Of course, as students of penology have long noted, calculating the punitive weight of
noncustodial penalties is extraordinarily difficult for many reasons, including subjective
differences in the manner they are imposed by authorities and experienced by defendants. See
NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE
PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 75-81 (1990) (proposing use of such scales
in the original sentencing context). 
245. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 305-06 (1931).
246. Id. Today such an argument seems purely legalistic given the pinched way in which
the President and most state governors exercise their commutation powers. See generally
Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569874
(cataloging decline in the use of executive clemency). However, the clemency powers of the
President were exercised with regularity until 1980. Id. at 27. In the states, the clemency
powers were similarly exercised among the states throughout the early years of the twentieth
century, after which they were gradually replaced by use of executively controlled parole. Id.
at 21 n.59. Consequently, at the time Benz was decided, concern that the judicial and
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months incarceration in federal court.247 After his sentence com-
menced, but before the court’s term had ended, the defendant moved
for sentence modification.248 The district court granted the motion,
reducing the sentence to six months imprisonment. On appeal, the
government argued that the court’s reduction of a valid sentence
after it had been partly served was an invasion of the executive’s
power under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States
Constitution.249 The Court rejected that challenge, however, and
declared:
The judicial power and the executive power over sentences are
readily distinguishable. To render judgment is a judicial
function. To carry the judgment into effect is an executive
function. To cut short a sentence by an act of clemency is an
exercise of executive power which abridges the enforcement of
the judgment, but does not alter it qua judgment. To reduce a
sentence by amendment alters the terms of the judgment itself
and is a judicial act as much as the imposition of the sentence in
the first instance.250
State courts ruling on challenges to Rule 35 analog statutes
have ordinarily rejected separation of powers claims on similar
grounds.251 In at least one case, however, a state court found a
separation of powers violation when a trial court held in abeyance
a motion for sentence modification, failing to rule on it within a
reasonable amount of time following the prescribed 120-day limit.252
executive powers might conflict had more grounding in practice than it would today.
247. Benz, 282 U.S. at 306.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 311.
251. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 536 P.2d 820, 822 (Colo. 1975) (holding that the 1970 version
of Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) did not violate separation of powers doctrine or
executive power of commutation).
252. State v. Chapman, 825 P.2d 74, 78-79 (Idaho 1992) (refusing to permit a judicial
“invasion of the executive authority held by the Commission of Pardons and Parole” and
holding that a trial court’s failure to timely rule on a validly filed Rule 35 motion divested the
court of jurisdiction); see also Brandt v. State, 796 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Idaho 1990) (holding that
an attempt by the judiciary to use Idaho Criminal Rule 35 outside the statute’s 120-day
jurisdictional limit “would clearly violate the separation of powers, Idaho Constitution art. 2,
by allowing the judiciary to encroach upon the pardoning and paroling authority of the
executive branch, Idaho Constitution art. 4, § 7, and the power of the legislature to establish
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Often, the invocation of the phrase “separation of powers” in the
context of state sentence modification has been less about constitu-
tional law than about good public policy.253 In some jurisdictions,
like Maryland, sentence modification by the trial court can arguably
impinge on the executive branch power to implement the sentence
by undermining the decision of the paroling authority.254 This
argument has influenced the development of the common law
surrounding sentence modification in Wisconsin, where courts have
self-imposed limits on their ability to consider factors that would
ordinarily fall within the purview of the parole board. In modern
sentencing practice, the shift of power between the judiciary and the
executive has been fluid with respect to sentencing. Indeterminate
sentencing with its emphasis on parole boards gave way to determi-
nate sentencing with its emphasis on judicially imposed durations
of confinement.255 It is not surprising that new efforts to expand
early release might permit a mixture of executively controlled
release and judicially controlled sentence modification. Viewed in
historical context, the potential coexistence of judicial sentence
modification and executive controlled release mechanisms appears
more a legitimate legislative policy decision than an unconstitu-
tional usurpation of executive power by the judiciary. Not surpris-
ingly then, Benz and the state cases that followed it have largely
established that sentence modification does not violate the separa-
tion of powers doctrine per se. 
A distinct separation of powers challenge has arisen, however,
with respect to newly enacted, shared decision-making legislation.
In State v. Stenklyft, a litigant challenged a new Wisconsin statute
that gave district attorneys veto power over petitions for discre-
tionary sentence reduction filed by qualifying state prisoners.256
Under the terms of the statute, certain felony offenders could seek
sentence reduction after serving a designated portion of their
custodial sentences.257 Before a judge could grant relief, however,
suitable punishment”).
253. See, e.g., Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 27-36.
254. See supra note 170 (observing that some Maryland sentencing judges have admitted
to modifying sentences in response to the parole board’s unwillingness to grant release).
255. See supra Part I.A.
256. 697 N.W.2d 769, 773-75 (Wis. 2005).
257. The statute provided that any of the following grounds could justify a reduction in
sentence:
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the prosecuting attorney was entitled to notification.258 If the
prosecutor objected to the petition, the judge was obliged to deny the
petition outright; if not, the judge retained discretion to either deny
the motion or reduce the prisoner’s sentence, if doing so was in the
public interest.259 While acknowledging that “[s]entencing a defen-
dant is an area of shared responsibility” among the branches of
government, the Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized that “the
power to decide an individual case is an exclusive core judicial
power, and any invasion of the exclusive core constitutional powers
of the judiciary violates the doctrine of separation of powers under
our state constitution.”260 Because the statute permitted a party to
the original criminal action to dictate the outcome of a sentence
reduction case, the court held that the district attorney veto
provision of the statute was unconstitutional.261 Although the case
law exploring the constitutionality of shared decision-making pro-
visions is sparse, Stenklyft suggests that courts addressing constitu-
tional challenges may be unwilling to cede too much gatekeeping
1. The inmate’s conduct, efforts at and progress in rehabilitation, or
participation and progress in education, treatment, or other correctional
programs since he or she was sentenced. 
....
3. A change in law or procedure related to sentencing or revocation of extended
supervision effective after the inmate was sentenced that would have resulted
in a shorter term of confinement in prison or, if the inmate was returned to
prison upon revocation of extended supervision, a shorter period of confinement
in prison upon revocation, if the change had been applicable when the inmate
was sentenced. 
4. The inmate is subject to a sentence of confinement in another state or the
inmate is in the United States illegally and may be deported. 
5. Sentence adjustment is otherwise in the interests of justice. 
WIS. STAT. § 973.195(1r)(b) (2003). 
258. Specifically, the statute provided that the sentencing court could deny the petition
upon receipt or hold it for further consideration. If the court held the petition, it was required
to notify the district attorney, and in some instances the victim. Id. § 973.195(1r)(c)-(d).
259. The statute plainly provided: “If the district attorney objects to adjustment of the
inmate’s sentence within 45 days of receiving notification ... the court shall deny the inmate’s
petition.” Id. § 973.195(1r)(c). If, however, the court received no objection to sentence
adjustment from the district attorney and the court determined that sentence adjustment was
in the public interest, the court was permitted to reduce the inmate’s sentence if the court
provided a written explanation. Id. § 973.195(f). 
260. Stenklyft, 697 N.W.2d at 794, 796. But see Beanblossom v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1345,
1348 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (reaching the opposite conclusion with respect to a similar state
statute).
261. Stenklyft, 697 N.W.2d at 797-98.
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power to executive actors, be they prosecutors or even, perhaps,
prison officials. 
2. Practical Questions
Beyond constitutional considerations lie practical questions
regarding the administrability of judicial sentence modification.
First is a question of administrative capacity: will courts be
overwhelmed by the process of adjudicating motions for judicial
sentence modification? Second is a question of utility: will judges
use the mechanism if given the opportunity? Third is a question of
scale: are sentence modification decisions likely to respond ade-
quately to the cost concerns that have motivated states’ newfound
willingness to provide for early release? 
American courts are busy places, and judges often struggle to
keep pace with their expanding dockets. We therefore need to ques-
tion whether courts have the administrative capacity to reconsider
large numbers of already-imposed sentences. While it is true that
any new legislation authorizing judicial sentence modification
would likely lead to a temporary surge in filings, it seems unlikely
that such motions would clog dockets or otherwise impede the
orderly administration of justice in the trial courts. Why not? First,
experience demonstrates that courts routinely receive and review
correspondence from prisoners seeking relief in various forms,
whether authorized by law or not; thus, it is possible that the
passage of laws would simply give new captions (and possible
merit) to requests already being processed by the courts. Moreover,
jurisdictions such as Wisconsin and Maryland that currently utilize
sentence modification appear to do so efficiently and without
detriment to the court’s ability to manage other demands on its
time. 
Yet even if new legislation were to lead to a substantial increase
in motions for sentence reduction, so long as courts remained free
to deny motions without hearing, it is unlikely that the number of
filings would present any serious threat to courts’ administrative
resources. Over the past twenty years, increases in pro se litigation
have forced courts to develop administrative procedures for effi-
ciently handling motions filed by unrepresented litigants in all
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areas of law.262 It is therefore likely that courts would be able to
easily adapt current administrative processing procedures to handle
motions for sentence modification. Court staff might screen motions
from litigants who do not qualify for sentence modification, either
because they did not file their motions on time, they do not fall
within the class of litigants authorized to file for sentence reduction,
or they have not alleged a proper ground for relief.263 Even when a
prisoner has met all relevant criteria, because sentence modifica-
tion is a discretionary remedy, a judge would be permitted to deny
hearing when the facts alleged to be true are insufficient to convince
her that a reduction in sentence is warranted. Having thus screened
out meritless and nonpersuasive motions, a much smaller and more
manageable universe of cases would be left for full hearing and
possible sentence modification. 
The next question, then, is whether judges will want to hold
hearings and modify sentences. Mechanisms for early release are
only meaningful to the extent that they are utilized, and it is fair to
ask whether judges would want to revisit sentencing decisions that
may have been difficult to render in the first instance. Although the
lack of empirical data on judges’ use of sentence modification
prevents more than educated speculation on this point, the limited
information available suggests that the power to modify is one many
judges do exercise when authorized to do so. Professors Grossman
and Shapiro’s 2003 study of the use of sentence modification in
262. Federal and state courts have developed a variety of procedures that can assist them
in sifting potentially meritorious cases from meritless ones. Examples of such procedures
include the use of designated forms that allow screeners to quickly identify relevant
information and the employment of specialized pro se or writ clerks to screen initial filings.
See, e.g., AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, REVISED PRO SE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2002),
available at http://www.ajs.org/prose/pdfs/Policy%20Recom.pdf (“[Encouraging courts to]
develop simplified court forms that are understandable to and easily utilized by the self-
represented ... will not only serve to enhance the efficiency of the litigation process by saving
time for court staff, litigants and judges, but also will enhance the fairness of legal
proceedings.”); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RESOURCE GUIDE FOR MANAGING PRISONER CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION 12 (1996) (discussing screening of prisoner civil rights complaints by
designated pro se law clerks in federal district courts).
263. The process of screening pro se litigation is a common one, sometimes required by
statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (2006) (requiring pre-service screening of all in forma pauperis
civil suits filed by prisoners to ensure litigants have stated a claim on which relief may be
granted), and sometimes voluntarily undertaken. Administrative screening can streamline
the judicial process, allowing judges to quickly assess whether a litigant meets statutory
prerequisites for relief. 
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Maryland reports that the practice was strongly favored by state
judges, prompting a unanimous vote in 2002 by the Maryland
Conference of Circuit Judges to oppose legislation designed to limit
judges’ power to modify sentences.264 Moreover, the fact that
Maryland judges modified the sentences of more than one hundred
violent felons between 2005 and 2009 suggests they may be
modifying sentences with some frequency in cases involving less
serious offenses.265 In Wisconsin, informal examinations of sentence
modification suggest that despite stringent common law restrictions,
judges remain willing to modify sentences in at least some cases.266
And while the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
does not track outcomes in motions for sentence modification
made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the U.S. Sentencing
Commission recently reported that judges have been making robust
use of their power to modify sentences under another federal
sentence modification statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits
judges to reduce sentences to give discretionary retroactive effect
to changes in the Sentencing Guideline provisions for certain
offenses.267 These actions are consistent with the inference that, if
authorized, the power to modify sentences is one the judiciary would
be willing to exercise in at least some cases. 
Yet even if judges are authorized to modify sentences and are
amenable to doing so in some situations, the question remains
whether judicial sentence modification is a mechanism well suited
to deliver the cost savings states hope to obtain from early release
legislation. Unlike sentence credit, judicial sentence modification
cannot provide sentence reduction en masse through pure adminis-
trative action—however structured, judicial modification will always
require individualized consideration of each application for relief.
That does not mean, though, that the mechanism cannot serve as an
important ameliorative device. Parole also requires individualized
release determinations preceded by hearings, and as discussed in
264. See Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 28 & n.208. 
265. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 190-94 and accompanying text.
267. See Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 7, Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010) (No. 09-6338) (reporting
that following a 2007 reduction in the guidelines for crack cocaine offenses, the district court
ruled on 23,471 motions and granted 15,501, with an average sentence reduction of 25 months
imprisonment).
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Part II.A.1, many recent budget-conscious reforms have focused on
expanding parole eligibility on the assumption that doing so will
have measurable effects on correctional expenditures. Insofar as
the mechanisms of parole and sentence modification both require
individualized assessments of offenders, sentence modification has
equal potential for providing relief in the form of early release. Both
mechanisms require individualized release determinations and both
rely on the willingness of decision makers to exercise their power to
release offenders from prison to the community.268 Therefore, setting
aside the many unique benefits of the judicial mechanism discussed
above, the judicially based mechanism has as much capacity to save
states’ money as more popular, prison-controlled methods of back-
end release.
3. Additional Considerations
Apart from potential practical obstacles to the widespread use of
judicial sentence modification are questions about the mechanism’s
theoretical soundness. First and most pressing among these is the
question of whether judges are the best-positioned officials to
render early release decisions. The idea of sentencer as sentence
modifier creates an appealing conceptual symmetry; however, there
are arguments to be made against allowing judges to control release
decisions.
In an ideal case, an offender seeking sentence modification would
return to the judge who sentenced him. That judge would be armed
with reliable information about the offender, his crime, the local
community from which he came and to which he would be returning,
268. Of course, it may be that the accountability that attaches to making a release decision
in open court might lead judges to hesitate before granting prisoners any substantial
reduction in sentence. Such hesitation might stem from any number of factors, including
whether judicial sentence modification has an established tradition within the jurisdiction,
whether judicial officials are elected or appointed, and the degree to which judicial release
decisions are guided by statute. It is important to remember, however, that judicial officials
are not the only decision makers subject to political constraints. Parole boards, as arms of the
executive, are subject to many similar pressures that limit their willingness to provide for
early release to the degree legislatures may desire. See SIMON, supra note 7, at 160 (reporting
that the parole rate for eligible California prisoners dropped to 5 percent from 1983 to 1991,
to 1 percent from 1991 to 1999, and then to almost zero through 2002); Reitz, supra note 50,
at 227 (noting “the susceptibility of parole boards to political influence and a natural
institutional drift toward severity in practice”). 
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the kind of programs the offender had completed in anticipation of
release and what, if anything, he had gained from them, along with
a concrete plan for the offender’s post-release living arrangements,
employment, treatment, and community supervision. With that
information in hand, the judge would then make a nuanced
assessment of whether the offender might be able to return to the
community earlier than provided by the original sentence without
unduly diminishing the punishment appropriate for the crime or
unreasonably compromising public safety. 
In reality, given the volume of criminal cases processed by state
courts, it is unlikely that most judges will remember any but the
most notorious criminal offenders. Ironically, those are the offenders
who would be least likely to qualify for early release due to the
severity of their crimes. It is the low-level thieves, minor drug
dealers, and drunk drivers who are most likely to be eligible for
sentence modification;269 they are also likely to be the least memora-
ble. Compounding questions about the judge’s personal knowledge
of any given prisoner is the fact that oftentimes the judge who
imposed the sentence will be unavailable to review an offender’s
request for sentence modification. The original judge may have
changed jobs, retired, or moved on to a different rotation in the court
system. In such cases, although the original “court” will hear the
prisoner’s petition, the sentencing judge, with her potentially
unique knowledge of the offender and his crime, will not. 
Personal knowledge of the offender and his offense is not the only
information judges may lack. Insofar as judicial sentence modifica-
tion is conceived as a direct descendant of traditional parole release
under the rehabilitative model, there are good reasons to question
reliance on judges as decision makers.270 Not only may a judge’s
historical memory of any given offender and crime be fuzzy to
nonexistent, but the judge’s knowledge of the offender’s post-
sentencing conduct, program participation, and overall “institu-
269. Cf. supra note 179. 
270. Commenting on the fact that the parole boards did not seek judicial input before
rendering their release decisions, Judge Frankel once observed that “the idea of consulting
the sentencing judge [in such an instance] is essentially nonsense anyhow.” Frankel, supra
note 32, at 16 n.54. Frankel explained: “The judge has had no opportunity for the kind of
observation that is supposedly for the Parole Board. He knows nothing of the post-sentencing
history. He is likely, in a word, to have nothing to contribute.” Id. 
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tional rehabilitation” is likely to be poorly developed and based on
limited information provided by the offender himself. Moreover, any
documentation of institutional conduct that courts do receive will
likely be of limited utility because, unlike parole boards, many
judges do not possess any specialized knowledge of the difference
between various correctional treatment programs or understand the
seriousness or insignificance of different types of disciplinary
infractions. Consequently, if release decisions are to be based upon
post-sentencing institutional factors alone, there is something to be
said for leaving release decisions in the hands of correctional
officials. 
But although release decisions must account for certain basic
facts about post-sentencing conduct—for example, whether the
offender committed further crimes while incarcerated—it remains
true that institutional facts are imperfect predictors of successful
reentry.271 Local considerations such as the availability of com-
munity-based treatment options, the existence of informal social
controls, and the perspective of crime victims may, depending on the
particular case, be at least as relevant to the release decision as the
number of institutional programs in which an offender has partici-
pated. With respect to these considerations, the judge may be far
better informed than the statewide parole board, and her decisions
may therefore be more attuned to public safety considerations.
Support for that proposition draws strength from the growing
popularity of reentry courts, which position judges as community
problem solvers.272 In these specialized courts, judges manage
offenders immediately following incarceration, setting conditions
with which offenders must comply and monitoring compliance
through frequent court hearings, augmented by out-of-court
community-based treatment programming.273 The growing popu-
271. See, e.g., SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD
THEIR LIVES 10-14 (2001) (suggesting that desistance from crime derives from offenders’
internal narratives); John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from
Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 25 (2001) (connecting desistance to employment and marriage,
both factors that are limited by institutional confinement).
272. See Shadd Maruna & Thomas P. LeBel, Welcome Home? Examining the “Reentry
Court” Concept from a Strengths-Based Perspective, 4 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 91, 91-92 (2003);
Eric J. Miller, The Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 127,
127-28 (2007).
273. Maruna & LeBel, supra note 272, at 92.
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larity of these judicially administered programs suggests not only
that judges may be capable of assessing whether and under what
conditions offenders may be safely returned to their communities,
but also that there is a degree of public tolerance for the judiciary’s
ability to do so. 
Moreover, to the degree that the early release decision invites
reexamination of the normative question of whether the offender
has been sufficiently punished for his offense, courts—not parole
boards—have traditionally been arbiters of justice with respect to
the outer limits, at least, of the quantum of punishment merited in
any given case.274 It is courts that are thought to possess the moral
authority to “pass judgment,” and it is for that reason that the
sentencing has traditionally been imposed by the court. Insofar as
other forms of early release invite prison administrators and parole
boards to second-guess the amount of punishment imposed by the
judge, we may worry that their decisions will be driven by adminis-
trative concerns at the expense of offender accountability. Judges,
therefore, possess some significant institutional advantages when
it comes to deciding whether an offender should be given early
release. 
That leaves one more important question: will allowing judges to
make release decisions unfairly exacerbate disparities already
present in the criminal justice system, thereby making the practice
intolerably unjust regardless of its potential expediency? Some have
argued that the parole board’s distance from local communities is
actually one of its strengths, since unlike the local judge, the
statewide parole board sees the “big picture” and can time release
decisions in individual cases to correct for inequitable sentencing
disparities.275 Setting aside the question of whether parole boards
274. Grossman & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 32 (asserting that judges are better-
positioned than parole boards to understand the nature and seriousness of an offender’s
crime, the offender’s degree of personal culpability, and the effect of the crime on the victim
and the community). 
275. As Professor Albert Alschuler has put it, 
[t]he back-end agency is a jurisdiction-wide agency so it is in a much better
position to eliminate disparities than sending it back to the sentencing judge.
[Professor Richard] Frase says sentencing is a judicial function, but it has never
been an exclusively judicial function. The back end is better able to take account
of institutional needs. 
Margaret Colgate Love, Sentence Reduction Mechanisms in a Determinate Sentencing System:
Report of the Second Look Roundtable, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 211, 221 (2009) (quoting Professor
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are well positioned to decide what is inequitable, it is true that
judicial release decisions have the potential to exacerbate preexist-
ing disparities. This is true for several reasons. First, some judges
will inevitably be more willing to reconsider sentences than will
others, a difference that means some judges may deny all motions
for sentence modification out of hand, while others hold hearings
and grant relief in a substantial number of cases.276 Second, even
among judges who are open to exercising their discretionary power,
worries about public safety may limit their willingness to reduce
sentences for offenders in need of services in communities lacking
the formal and informal resources that would permit safe return
to the community. Such considerations suggest that offenders re-
turning to disadvantaged communities might be less likely to secure
early release than offenders returning to communities better able
to meet their needs for supervision or community-based program-
ming. 
The fact that a release decision might turn on factors beyond the
offender’s desert and outside his control is troubling; however, it is
important to distinguish between disparate effects that may flow
from discretionary decisions and the disparate application of law
itself. All can agree that it would be improper to apply different
legal standards to different offenders in making release decisions.
That is different, however, from recognizing that the application of
identical standards—for example, whether the offender can be
safely released to the community at this time given the available
resources—may yield different answers in different cases.277 Those
who prefer harsh treatment for all prisoners to potential relief for
some may conclude that judicial sentence modification will not pay
its way. But insofar as too many prison sentences are exacting too
much both fiscally and socially, a minor amount of increased
Albert Alschuler, Statements at the American Bar Association Commission on Effective
Criminal Sanctions Second Look Roundtable (Dec. 8, 2008)).
276. The data collected by the Maryland Sentencing Commission is consistent with this
observation. The Commission’s annual reports from 2005 to 2009 show that judges in the
Third Circuit (composed of Baltimore and Harford counties) reported no sentence
modifications, while judges in the equally urban Seventh Circuit (Prince George’s, St. Mary’s,
Calvert, and Charles counties) modified sentences in 155 reported cases, making that district
responsible for 75 percent of reported sentence modifications during the relevant five-year
period. See supra note 177.
277. Parole decisions themselves may, of course, be subject to the same critique. 
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disparity may ultimately be more tolerable than maintaining the
status quo. Judicial sentence modification offers willing judges a
way to reduce sentences that appear unnecessarily punitive in a
way that is open to public scrutiny. For that reason, despite its
limitations, the mechanism has potential to bring greater legitimacy
to the early release decision. 
CONCLUSION
As states continue to struggle with the costs of mass incarceration
in this time of financial crisis, they are likely to discover that the
public’s willingness to reduce prison populations is highly condi-
tional. Early release mechanisms that enhance the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system are therefore to be preferred over those that
may be perceived as unaccountable or abusive. 
Whatever form judicial sentence modification may take—whether
time-limited or open-ended, permitted only for “extraordinary”
reasons or for more mundane ones—it has the potential to transpar-
ently display the work of the criminal justice system and enhance
judicial and offender accountability in ways that other, more
common forms of early release cannot. For that reason, states
seeking to cut correctional costs through the use of early release
would do well to give serious consideration to making use of the
mechanism’s untapped potential. Given its unique attributes,
judicial sentence modification promises to be the most legitimate,
and hence the most sustainable, early release mechanism available
today. 
